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Abstract 
 
In 2009, the Obama Administration created a program 
intended to prevent home mortgage foreclosures by allowing 
modifications of the mortgages. The program was HAMP – Home 
Affordable Modification Program. HAMP has been a notorious 
failure, with a July 2015 report stating that only 30% of homeowners 
who applied for modifications were successful. Although servicer 
misconduct in administration of HAMP has been rampant, courts 
generally have not allowed homeowners to secure judicial review of 
denials of mortgage modifications. 
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This article advances an argument that has not been made in litigation 
or commentary: that at least for mortgages held or guaranteed by 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (which comprise more than half the 
mortgages in the U.S.), judicial review of modification denials is 
available under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This is the 
case because before HAMP was created, Fannie and Freddie had 
been put into conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency, which unquestionably is subject to the APA and is in total 
control of every aspect of the activities of Fannie and Freddie. Thus, 
the denials are final agency action subject to judicial review. 
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I. Introduction 
 
“The availability of judicial review is the 
necessary condition, psychologically if not 
logically, of a system of administrative 
power which purports to be legitimate, or 
legally valid.” 
 
-Louis Jaffe, Judicial Control of 
Administrative Justice 320 (1965). 
 
 “A goal of Congress ‘was surely to prevent 
these banks from hoodwinking borrowers . . 
. .’” 
 
-Judge David Hamilton, writing for the court 
in Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 
F.3d 547, 580 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 
 “Housing was at the heart of the [financial] crisis” of 2008,1 
and Congress and the Executive Branch reacted to the challenge with 
a series of inter-related actions directed at stabilizing the U.S. housing 
market. On July 30, 2008, Congress passed and President Bush signed 
into law the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA).2 
HERA created a new federal agency, the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), and authorized it to put into conservatorship Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, “Government Sponsored Entities” (GSEs) that 
owned or guaranteed approximately half the mortgages in the United 
States.3 On September 6, 2008, at the urging of the Secretary of the 
                                               
1
 TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 
300 (2014). 
2 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-
289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 
26, 38 and 42 U.S.C.). 
3
 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS 1 (2015), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/FHFA_2014_Rep
ort_to_Congress.pdf, [https://perma.cc/3TTN-VUG9?type=source] (“During 
2014, FHFA continued to serve as regulator and conservator of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.”); JOHN RAO ET AL., FORECLOSURES AND MORTGAGE 
SERVICING § 5.11.1 n.412 (5th ed. 2014) (stating that when the 
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Treasury, FHFA imposed the conservatorship, taking total control 
over Fannie and Freddie.4 “A key component of the conservatorships” 
has been the commitment of the U.S. Department of the Treasury “to 
provide financial support to” the GSEs.5 
 In October 2008, Congress enacted the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA), which created the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP).6 EESA required the Secretary of the Treasury to, 
among many other things, “implement a plan that seeks to maximize 
assistance for homeowners and . . . minimize foreclosures.”7 
 On March 4, 2009, the Administration introduced two 
versions of a mortgage modification program called “HAMP”—Home 
Affordable Modification Program. One, announced by the Department 
of the Treasury, was “Non-GSE HAMP,” “for mortgage loans that are 
not owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac . . . .”8 The 
                                               
conservatorship was imposed, Fannie and Freddie “owned or guaranteed 
almost thirty-one million mortgages, about [58%] of all single-family 
mortgages”). The formal names of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are, 
respectively, the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, 
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 932-33 (5th ed. 2007). 
4 HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE 
COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 1, 2, 6, 162-66 (2010) (“I had 
proposed that we seize control of the companies.”); see infra notes 46-50 and 
the accompanying text (discussing FHFA’s total control of Fannie and 
Freddie). 
5 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1; see PAULSON, supra note 4, at 
165-66; see also infra notes 43-45 and the accompanying text. 
6 See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), Pub. L. No. 
110-343, §§ 101, 109, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767, 3774 (2008), (codified as 
amended in12 U.S.C. §§ 5211, 5219 (2012)); Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In response to rapidly deteriorating 
financial market conditions in the late summer and early fall of 2008, 
Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.”). 
7 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a) (2012); Wigod, 673 F.3d at 556. 
8 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 09-01, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE: 
INTRODUCTION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 1 
(2009), https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/ 
sd0901.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCD2-V7SR]; Wigod, 673 F.3d at 556; RAO ET 
AL., supra note 3, at § 5.8.2.1 (outlining Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
implementation of the HAMP program); see also GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 
300-02 (discussing the creation of HAMP).  
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other, GSE HAMP, was announced by the GSEs (which were 
controlled by FHFA).9 
 Non-GSE and GSE HAMP are similar in many ways, and both 
are implemented by servicers, agents of the mortgage holders that 
receive payments from borrowers and make payments with respect to 
those amounts.10 Discussions of the two often conflate them, a 
confusion which is nurtured by the fact that non-GSE HAMP is 
administered by Fannie and Freddie because Treasury delegated that 
responsibility to them.11 Non-GSE and GSE HAMP differ from each 
                                               
9 See FANNIE MAE, ANNOUNCEMENT 09-05R 1 (2009), 
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/0905.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AT44-C4YL] (“This Announcement provides guidance to 
Fannie Mae servicers for adoption and implementation of the Home 
Affordable Modification Program.”); FREDDIE MAC, BULLETIN NO. 2009-6 1 
(2009), http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/bulletins/pdf/ 
bll096.pdf [http://perma.cc/5999-NVQJ] (“Servicers may begin offering 
modifications under [HAMP].”). 
10 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(2) (2012) (defining servicing as “receiving any 
scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any 
loan”); RAO ET AL., supra note 3, § 5.8.2.1; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
11 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & FANNIE MAE, FINANCIAL AGENCY 
AGREEMENT FOR A HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION PROGRAM UNDER THE 
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 1 (2009), 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/procurement/faa 
/Financial_Agency_Agreements/Fannie%20Mae%20FAA%20021809.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8Q9F-99KK]; U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & FREDDIE MAC, 
FINANCIAL AGENCY AGREEMENT FOR A HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION 
PROGRAM UNDER THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008 
1 (2009), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ procure 
ment/faa/Financial_Agency_Agreements/Freddie%20Mac%20Financial%2
0Agency%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZAS-BUQ2]; FED. HOUS. 
FIN. AGENCY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN, EVL-2011-003, EVALUATION OF 
FHFA’S ROLE IN NEGOTIATING FANNIE MAE’S AND FREDDIE MAC’S 
RESPONSIBILITIES IN TREASURY’S MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM 12 
(2011), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content /Files/EVL-2011-003.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/K699-6PYH] [hereinafter REPORT EVL-2011-003] 
(describing Fannie’s role as “program administrator” and Freddie’s as 
“compliance agent”); FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 
5 (2011), https://www.novoco.com/hottopics/resource_files/lihtc/gses 
/fhfa_report_061311.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6PM-268X] (“Fannie Mae has 
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other, however, in several respects, including that servicer 
participation in GSE HAMP is mandatory and reduction of principal 
is not permitted.12 It is notable that it was FHFA that decided that the 
GSEs would not participate in the HAMP Principal Reduction 
Alternative (or the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
Short Refinance program) with respect to loans they own or 
guarantee.13 
 Servicers often egregiously violate HAMP requirements.14 It 
has been difficult, however, for homeowners to secure review of 
servicer misconduct. There has been no effective administrative 
oversight from any agency, and courts generally have refused to 
permit judicial review of these claims.15 Some courts have held that 
there is no private right of action to enforce HAMP; others have held 
that borrowers do not have standing or third party beneficiary status to 
enforce the Servicer Participation Agreements (SPAs) between the 
                                               
assumed the role of MHA program administrator and Freddie Mac the role of 
MHA compliance agent.”). 
12 FANNIE MAE, supra note 9, at 1 (requiring participation); see also NAT’L 
CONSUMER LAW CTR., AT A CROSSROADS: LESSONS FROM THE HOME 
AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM (HAMP) 27-28 (2013), 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/loan_mod/hamp-
report-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/E6GV-WPU3] (“GSE HAMP rules lag 
behind HAMP in four areas: 1. Principal reductions are not available; 2. GSE 
servicers have tight timelines, enforced with monetary sanctions, for 
initiating and processing foreclosures, and the solicitation standards require 
much less outreach by servicers before initiating foreclosure; 3. There is no 
appeals process; and 4. Homeowners in bankruptcy face hurdles.”). This was 
written before the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CPFB) rules 
required an appeals process. See infra notes 105-07 and the accompanying 
text. 
13 See REPORT EVL-2011-003, supra note 11, at 17 (“FHFA formally notified 
Treasury of its refusal to permit the Enterprises to participate in both the 
HAMP Principal Reduction Alternative and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s Short Refinance programs with respect to loans that 
they own or guarantee.”). 
14 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 12, at 4; see also infra notes 69-
70 and the accompanying text. 
15 REPORT EVL-2011-003, supra note 11, at 7 (“Although the results of these 
efforts represent a significant improvement over the initial FAAs, the revised 
agreements do not establish specific procedures for resolving disputes among 
the parties.”); see infra notes 71-78 and the accompanying text. 
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servicers and Fannie Mae.16 The one situation in which homeowners 
have had some success in securing judicial review has been with 
respect to claims that they had been accepted for Trial Period Plans 
(TPPs) where homeowners performed their obligations under those 
plans but then, allegedly, had not been granted permanent 
modifications under HAMP. In some of these cases, courts have held 
that the homeowners had cognizable contract, state consumer 
protection, and related claims under the TPP.17 Courts have not 
distinguished between GSE and non-GSE HAMP in any of this 
litigation. 
 This article considers a principle of judicial review that 
apparently has not yet been raised in challenges to denials of mortgage 
modifications: the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which 
provides that “final agency action for which there is no other adequate 
remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review” and that a person 
aggrieved by federal agency action “is entitled to judicial review 
thereof.”18 For GSE HAMP, when a servicer processes a mortgage 
modification request, it acts as an agent for its principal, which was 
Fannie or Freddie but now is FHFA, a federal agency that 
“succeed[ed] to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of” Fannie and 
                                               
16 Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 559 n.4 (7th Cir. 2012); 
see also infra notes 71-78 and the accompanying text.  
17 See, e.g., Wigod,  673 F.3d at 562 (“[A] reasonable person in [promisee’s] 
position would read the TPP as a definite offer to provide permanent 
modification that she could accept so long as she satisfied the conditions.”); 
Corvello v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that, by the TPP’s terms, mortgage modification was impossible before the 
requirements were met, but a servicer could not “unilaterally and without 
justification refuse to send the offer”); Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 
F.3d 224, 234 (1st Cir. 2013) (highlighting the mandatory language in the 
TPP requiring the lender to offer a modification if the borrower continued 
compliance with the TPP obligations); In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP) Contract Litig., No. 10-MD-02193, 2011 WL 
2637222, at *4-7 (D. Mass. July 6, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss contract 
and state consumer protection claims, among others); Amanda Martin, 
Litigating Consumer Protection Acts in the HAMP Context, 38 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 739, 751-63 (2015) (reviewing cases); Kelly Volkar, The TPP and 
Its Broken Promise, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2014) (discussing 
courts’ allowance of claims for contract breach, promissory estoppel, 
deceptive business practices, and fraudulent misrepresentation). 
18 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 702 (2012).  
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Freddie and “perform[s] all functions of the regulated entity in the 
name of the regulated entity which are consistent with the appointment 
as conservator or receiver . . . .”19 Thus, the denial of a mortgage 
modification for a mortgage owned or guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie 
is an action by their principal, FHFA, and is prima facie subject to 
judicial review under the APA. 
 Judicial review under the APA also should be available for 
modification denials under non-GSE HAMP. Since non-GSE HAMP 
is a program that was created by the U.S. Department of the Treasury 
to carry out a mandate imposed on Treasury by the Congress, Treasury 
is responsible for assuring compliance with the standards of the 
program.20 Although Treasury established the standards governing 
HAMP21 and “Treasury remains ultimately responsible for HAMP’s 
                                               
19 12 U.S.C. §§ 4617(b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(2)(B)(iii), (b)(2)(D) (2012) 
(emphasis added); see Dupuis v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 
139, 142-44 (D. Maine 1995) (discussing agency principles and concluding 
that the servicer is a general agent of Freddie Mac). Dupuis and other cases 
have held that Fannie and Freddie are not liable for their servicers’ unlawful 
acts because under Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 
(1947), government agencies are not liable for the unauthorized acts of their 
agents. See, e.g., Cannon v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 
1056 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (requiring agency authorization for the agent’s 
conduct); Johnson v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. C12-1712, 2013 
WL 308957 at *6 (W.D. Wash, Jan. 25, 2013) (“[T]he question . . . whether 
the alleged breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims are barred 
by the Merrill doctrine[] . . . turns on whether or not the actions of [the agent] 
were authorized or otherwise ratified by [the government agency].”) When 
the issue of liability—against the federal entities or the servicers—is 
addressed, Merrill may be pertinent, and courts will have to decide whether 
and to what extent it applies in this situation. Merrill does not, however, affect 
the question whether there is a private right of action under the APA. When 
the action proceeds, the court can determine the extent of the agent’s 
authority, the significance of the CFPB regulations, and whether Merrill 
protects the agent as well as the principal. In Paslowski v. Standard Mortgage 
Corp., for example, the court noted that the “harshness” of Merrill was 
“alleviated . . . by the fact that plaintiffs are not left without any recourse. 
Rather, recovery is sought, and may be had, against those who actually 
engaged in the conduct at issue—the servicers.” 129 F. Supp. 2d 793, 805 
(W.D. Pa. 2000). 
20 See 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a) (2012). 
21 RAO ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 5.8.1, 5.8.2 (discussing standards set in 
Treasury Supplemental Directives). 
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execution,” Treasury “essentially outsourced” implementation of 
HAMP to Fannie and Freddie—really, to FHFA, which had taken full 
control of the GSEs.22 If Fannie and Freddie were private entities, this 
might have raised questions about whether this delegation eviscerated 
rights that HAMP beneficiaries would have had against Treasury.23 
Since, however, Fannie and Freddie had been taken over by FHFA, 
which itself unquestionably is a federal agency subject to the APA, 
failure to enforce HAMP standards is action by either Treasury or 
FHFA and is, in either case, federal agency action prima facie subject 
to judicial review under the APA. 
 This article focuses on GSE HAMP and concludes that denials 
of mortgage modifications under that program are subject to judicial 
review under the APA. The principles would apply equally to other 
loss mitigation programs administered by FHFA for Fannie and 
Freddie. Part II below discusses Fannie, Freddie, FHFA, and HAMP. 
Part III addresses the APA and shows that there is no preclusion or 
limitation of judicial review of challenges to denials of mortgage 
modifications for GSE HAMP. 
                                               
22 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, NO. 62-622, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: A 
REVIEW OF TREASURY’S FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 5, 65, 73 
(2010), 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010243/http://cop.senate
.gov/documents/cop-121410-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/9HQQ-ZG7B]. 
23 See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, Six Simple Steps to Increase Contractor 
Accountability, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 241, 258-60 (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, eds. 
2009) (urging expanded APA application to contractors); Alfred C. Aman Jr., 
Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets 
More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 
1477, 1477 (2001) (analyzing government service privatization through a 
global lens); Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future Oriented 
Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 
31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780 (1998) (examining the effects of 
globalization on domestic law and how it affects global competition and states 
roles in the international system); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong Turn in 
Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 
50 DUKE L. J. 17, 125-38 (2000) (discussing application of the APA’s 
rulemaking requirements to a purportedly private entity); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 passim (2003) 
(discussing the application of agency principles to private entities acting on 
behalf of government agencies). 
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II. Fannie, Freddie, FHFA, and HAMP 
 
 Although discussions of HAMP usually begin with the EESA, 
which authorized its creation, full understanding of HAMP requires 
seeing it in the context of the federal government’s previously having 
taken control of Fannie and Freddie under HERA.24 HAMP was 
created in and for a context in which it would be administered by 
FHFA, which had taken control of Fannie and Freddie; HAMP was 
not created until after FHFA had put Fannie and Freddie into 
receivership.25 More generally, actions aimed at helping the housing 
market necessarily took (and take) into account the large percentage 
of mortgages held or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. As then 
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner said “[t]he largest and most 
important housing initiative” announced with HAMP, “although it 
wasn’t widely viewed as housing policy at the time, was a new $200 
billion capital commitment for Fannie and Freddie . . . .”26 
    Originating in response to the Great 
Depression of 1929, Fannie and Freddie nurture housing finance by 
purchasing mortgage loans so that loan originators have more capital 
with which to make more mortgage loans.27 Fannie and Freddie hold 
some of these mortgages in their portfolios, but “most mortgages are 
placed in mortgage pools to support MBS [mortgage-backed 
securities].”28 MBS issued by Fannie and Freddie may be held by those 
                                               
24 See Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 236 n.9 (1st Cir. 
2013) (explaining that HERA also “was designed to aid families facing 
foreclosure”). 
25 See infra notes 36-54 and the accompanying text.  
26 GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 303. 
27 Government Sponsored Enterprises, A Framework for Strengthening GSE 
Governance and Oversight: Testimony Before the S. Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 4 (2004) [hereinafter Government 
Sponsored Enterprises] (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General 
of the United States). For fuller discussions of Fannie and Freddie, see Andrea 
J. Boyack, Laudable Goals and Unintended Consequences: The Role and 
Control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1489, 1494 
(2011); Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—A Catalyst for 
Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L. J. 991, 991 (1986); Perry 
Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 208 (D.D.C. 2014). 
28
 Government Sponsored Enterprises, supra note 27, at 4-5. 
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entities or sold to investors; Fannie and Freddie “guarantee the timely 
payment of interest and principal on MBS that they issue.”29 
 Congress created Fannie in 1938 as “the Federal National 
Mortgage Association (FNMA), wholly owned and administered by 
the federal government.”30 In 1954, Congress made Fannie a “‘mixed 
ownership’ corporation, owned partly by private shareholders.”31 In 
1968, FNMA was divided into the Government National Mortgage 
Association (GNMA), “a pure federal agency,” and Fannie Mae, “a 
privately owned and managed corporation, although with certain ties 
to the federal government.”32  
 Congress created Freddie Mac in 1970; in 1989, in the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
(FIRREA), Congress “privatize[d]” Freddie to make it very much like 
Fannie.33 Thus, from 1970 until September 6, 2008, Fannie and 
Freddie were Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs), operating under 
combinations of private ownership, public and private board 
management, and federal regulatory supervision.34 
 In 2008, as part of the crisis that afflicted the U.S. mortgage 
market generally, Fannie and Freddie were in grave financial trouble.35 
                                               
29 Id. at 5.  
30 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 932. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 932-33. 
33 Id. at 933-34; Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 731, 103 Stat. 430 (1989) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1833e) (establishing Freddie Mac 
and its governing rules); see Liberty Mortg. Banking, Ltd. v. Fed. Home Loan 
Mortg. Corp., 822 F. Supp. 956, 958 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (reviewing the 
legislative history and stating that “[t]he legislative history of FIRREA 
suggests that the purpose of the 1989 amendments was to privatize the 
management and operations of Freddie Mac” in the way that Fannie had been 
privatized in 1968).  
34 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 933-34; see id. at 933-35 (describing 
the variety of government objectives Fannie and Freddie were to advance). 
35 PAULSON, supra note 4, at 142-47 (2010) (stating that Fannie and Freddie 
“lost almost half of their value” in one week in July 2008); FIN. CRISIS 
INQUIRY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE 
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 
311-14 (2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-
FCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/6TF5-6NPS] (acknowledging the losses incurred 
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At the urging of Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, on July 30, 2008 
Congress passed HERA.36 HERA created a new federal agency, 
FHFA, and authorized it to put Fannie and Freddie into receivership 
or conservatorship.37  
 In September 2008, Secretary Paulson concluded that Fannie 
and Freddie should be put into conservatorship.38 With the 
concurrence of other administration officials and President George W. 
Bush, he persuaded FHFA to impose the conservatorship.39 FHFA did 
this on September 6, 2008, “succeed[ing] to all rights, titles, powers, 
and privileges of [Fannie and Freddie] . . . and [their] assets.”40  
 HERA authorized FHFA to “take over the assets of and 
operate the regulated entity with all the powers of the shareholders, the 
directors, and the officers of the regulated entity and conduct all 
business of the regulated entity;” as conservator, FHFA was vested 
with the power to “take such action as may be . . . appropriate to carry 
on the business of the regulated entity” and, inter alia, to “perform all 
functions of the regulated entity in the name of the regulated entity 
                                               
by Fannie and Freddie); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 22, at 73 (“In 
2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac combined lost more than $108 billion.”). 
36 PAULSON, supra note 4, at 143-44, 147 (stating that President Bush “said it 
was unthinkable to let Fannie and Freddie fail—they would take down the 
capital markets and the dollar, and hurt the U.S. around the world”). See 
generally HERA, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 12, 26, 38, and 42 U.S.C.). 
37 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1. 
38 PAULSON, supra note 4, at 1, 162-64 (stating that his initial conclusion had 
been that they should be put into receivership, but he then was persuaded that 
conservatorship was preferable).  
39 Id. at 1, 2 (“[O]nly FHFA had the statutory power to put Fannie and Freddie 
into conservatorship. We had to convince its people that this was the right 
thing to do, while making sure to let them feel they were still in charge.”); id. 
at 165-66 (“Any Treasury investment would be conditioned on 
conservatorship.”). 
40 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also PAULSON, supra note 4, at 
170; Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal 
Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and 
Taxpayers, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Sept. 7, 2008), 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1129.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/4LTM-6SNH]. 
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which are consistent with the appointment as conservator or 
receiver.”41 
 HERA also authorized the Department of the Treasury “to 
lend or invest an unlimited amount of money” in Fannie and Freddie.42 
“Treasury represented the only feasible entity—public or private—
capable of injecting sufficient liquidity into and serving as a backstop 
for the GSEs within the short timeframe necessary to preserve their 
existence in September 2008.”43 Through 2014, Treasury invested 
more than $187.5 billion in these GSEs.44 Fannie and Freddie are 
“effectively owned by the government; Treasury has guaranteed their 
debts and FHFA has all the powers of the management, board, and 
shareholders of the GSEs.”45  
 As FHFA says, “FHFA as Conservator has been responsible 
for the conduct and administration of all aspects of the operations, 
business, and affairs of both Enterprises since September 6, 2008.”46 
FHFA appointed new chief executive officers at each entity and 
changed the officers’ compensation levels.47 FHFA introduced new 
guarantee fees and standards for data collection, property sales, 
                                               
41 12 U.S.C. §§ 4617(b)(2)(B)(I), 4617(b)(2)(D) (2012) (emphasis added). 
42 N. ERIC WEISS ET AL., HOUSING AND ECONOMIC RECOVERY ACT OF 2008 
1-2 (2008), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/113245.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/TE7N-FAW6?type=live]; see 12 U.S.C. § 1719(g)(1)(A) 
(2012) (governing loans and investments to Fannie); 12 U.S.C. § 
1455(l)(1)(A) (governing loans and investments to Freddie); see also Perry 
Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 216 (D.D.C. 2014) (“On December 
24, 2009, the parties executed the Second Amendment, which permitted the 
GSEs to continue to ‘draw unlimited sums from Treasury.’”). 
43 Perry Capital LLC, 70 F.Supp.3d at 232. 
44 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 1 (“Through December [2014], 
the Enterprises have paid the . . . Treasury a total of $225.4 billion in 
dividends on senior preferred stock, which pursuant to the PSPAs [Preferred 
Stock Purchase Agreements] do not constitute a repayment of the $187.5 
billion in draws.”). 
45 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 22, at 73. 
46 Conservatorship and Receivership, 76 Fed. Reg. 35,714, 35,725 (June 20, 
2011). 
47 Zachary A. Goldfarb, FHFA Appoints New Fannie and Freddie Chairmen, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com /wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/16/AR2008091603437.html 
[http://perma.cc/5GCD-2YKW]. 
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counterparties, and foreclosures;48 FHFA “exclude[d] principal 
forgiveness from its menu of loss mitigation tools” and “directed” 
Fannie and Freddie to “refrain from purchasing mortgage loans 
secured by properties” with first-lien obligations for energy retrofit 
programs.49 FHFA litigates on behalf of Fannie and Freddie.50 As a 
result of the conservatorship, “FHFA completely controls Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac.”51 
                                               
48 Melvin L. Watt, Prepared Remarks of Melvin L. Watt, Director, FHFA at 
the Greenlining Inst. 22nd Annual Economic Summit, FED. HOUS. FIN. 
AGENCY (May 8, 2015), http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/Public 
Affairs/Pages/Prepared-Remarks-FHFA-Director-at-Greenlining-Institute-
22nd-Annual-Economic-Summit.aspx [http://perma.cc/D5JL-XEHG]. 
49 Principal Forgiveness, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/Policy/Pages/Principal-
Foregivness.aspx [https://perma.cc/U4ND-8DSE]; Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 
PACE Programs, Opinion Letter (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www. 
nlc.org/documents/Influence%20Federal%20Policy/Advocacy/Regulatory/s
tmt-fhfa-guidance-pace-feb2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/96GJ-HZTJ]; see also 
Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
50 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS, 11-12, 70 (2013), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/2012_AnnualRep
ortToCongress_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9C3-GEXY?type=source]; see 
also FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 3, at 8 (detailing other ways in 
which FHFA controls Fannie and Freddie); Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency v. 
Nomura Holding America, 60 F. Supp. 3d 479, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(deciding the case initiated by the FHFA as conservator for the GSE against 
financial institutions involved in the packaging, marketing, and sale of 
residential mortgage-backed securities purchased by these entities). 
51 See Oakland Cnty. v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 276 F.R.D. 491, 494, 497 
(E.D. Mich. 2011) (agreeing that FHFA is entitled to intervene in cases 
involving Fannie or Freddie); see also County of Oakland v. Fed. Hous. Fin. 
Agency, 716 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2013); In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. MBS 
Litig., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“As conservator, FHFA 
has succeeded to all of the legal rights of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.”). 
There are many other decisions that treat FHFA as the actor. See, e.g., Town 
of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 227-28 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 897 F.Supp.2d 168, 181-82 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 2011 WL 
1158058, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 
674 F. Supp. 2d 483, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Although an interlocutory district 
court opinion in Herron v. Fannie Mae, 857 F. Supp. 2d 87 (D.D.C. 2012) 
held that even after FHFA had imposed the conservatorship, actions by 
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 Enacted on October 3, 2008, the EESA created, among other 
things, TARP and “included a mandate that TARP funds be used in a 
manner that ‘protects home values’ and ‘preserves 
homeownership.’”52 The statute authorized the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury to purchase certain troubled assets, including mortgages, and 
directed Treasury “to implement a plan that seeks to maximize 
assistance for homeowners and . . . encourage the servicers of the 
underlying mortgages . . . to take advantage of . . . available programs 
to minimize foreclosures.”53 EESA also authorized the Secretary of the 
Treasury to “use loan guarantees and credit enhancements to facilitate 
loan modifications to prevent avoidable foreclosures.”54 “Pursuant to 
this authority, the Secretary [of the Treasury] created an array of 
                                               
Fannie were not federal government actions, I have argued in detail that this 
decision (and those following it) are inconsistent with established precedent, 
scholarly analysis, and good reasoning. Florence Wagman Roisman, 
Protecting Homeowners from Non-Judicial Foreclosure of Mortgages Held 
by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 43 REAL EST. L.J. 125, 175-79 (2014). My 
analysis is strengthened by a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Dep’t of 
Transportation v. Ass’n of American Railroads, 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). See 
Florence Wagman Roisman, Mortgages Held by Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac May Not Be Foreclosed by Non-Judicial Foreclosure, 29 PROB. & PROP. 
13, 16 (2015) (concluding that in cases involving Fannie and Freddie, FHFA 
is the true party at interest). 
52 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 21, at 7; see also Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(2008) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5253 (2012)); Wigod v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 556 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing TARP 
as the “centerpiece of the Act . . . .”); SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 99 
(July 29, 2015), https://www.sigtarp.gov/ Quarterly%20Reports/July_29_ 
2015_Report_to_Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDW9-9K4D] [hereinafter 
SIGTARP] (referring to HAMP as the “signature TARP housing program” 
and emphasizing Congress’s determination that “the need to help families 
keep their homes” be honored in TARP). 
53 EESA § 109, 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1); see also Young v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 
717 F.3d 224, 228 (1st Cir. 2013) (“EESA authorized the secretary to, inter 
alia, ‘implement a plan that seeks to maximize assistance for homeowners 
and . . . encourage the servicers of the underlying mortgages’ to minimize 
foreclosures.”); Corvello v. Wells Fargo N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 
2013) (outlining the purpose of the HAMP program). See generally 
SIGTARP, supra note 51 (summarizing the HAMP program).  
54 12 U.S.C. § 5219(a)(1); see also Young, 717 F.3d at 228. 
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programs designed to identify likely candidates for loan modifications 
and encourage lenders to renegotiate their mortgages. HAMP is one of 
these programs.”55     
 For FHFA, EESA required that it “implement a plan to 
maximize assistance to homeowners; use its authority to encourage the 
servicers of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac mortgages to take advantage 
of federal programs to minimize foreclosures; coordinate within the 
federal government concerning homeowner assistance plans; and 
submit monthly reports to Congress detailing the progress of its 
efforts.”56 
 On February 18, 2009, “President Obama announced the 
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan” to help to avert 
foreclosures.57 On March 4, 2009, “Treasury issued uniform guidance 
for loan modifications across the mortgage industry.”58 On the same 
date, March 4, 2009, Fannie issued guidelines for GSE HAMP for 
mortgages owned, securitized, or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie 
and sent instructions to its servicers regarding mortgages owned, 
securitized, or guaranteed by Freddie.59 For mortgages they own, 
securitize, or guarantee, Fannie and Freddie have established detailed 
standards which are contained in Fannie’s Seller and Servicing 
Guides, with periodic updates, and Freddie’s Single Family 
Seller/Servicer Guide.60 While servicer participation in non-GSE 
                                               
55 Young, 717 F.3d at 228. 
56 REPORT EVL-2011-003, supra note 11, at 10; see also 12 U.S.C. § 5220. 
57 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 8, at 1. 
58 Id. 
59See FANNIE MAE, supra note 9, at 1; FREDDIE MAC, supra note 9, at 1. 
60 RAO ET AL., supra note 3, at § 5.11.1 (“As the largest investors in the 
mortgage marketplace, the two corporations set the industry standard on 
workout options. Fannie Mae’s policies are outlined in the company’s Selling 
and Servicing Guides together with their periodic updates.”); see also 
Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. Supp. 3d 94, 97 (D. Mass. 
2014); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, 15-04, SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTIVE: 
MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM –MHA PROGRAM EXTENSION AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE CLARIFICATIONS 1 (2015), https://www.hmpadmin. 
com/portal/programs/docs/hamp_servicer/sd1504.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/96ZK-Z4V6] (announcing the extension of the HAMP and 
other Making Home Affordable programs “at least through December 31, 
2016, and stating that standards relating to GSE loans (those owned, 
securitized, or guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie), are governed by “the GSEs’ 
respective servicing guides, announcements and bulletins”). Fannie’s Single-
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HAMP is, at least in theory, voluntary, servicer participation in GSE 
HAMP is mandatory.61 
 On April 6, 2009, Treasury provided detailed guidance for 
HAMP for mortgages not owned or guaranteed by Fannie or Freddie.62 
Treasury delegated implementation of this “non-GSE HAMP” to 
Fannie and Freddie.63    
 HAMP has been notoriously unsuccessful. In December 2010, 
echoing grave concerns expressed previously, the Congressional 
Oversight Panel noted that “the program has failed to help the vast 
majority of homeowners facing foreclosure” and that “if current trends 
hold, HAMP will prevent only 700,000 to 800,000 foreclosures—far 
fewer than the 3 to 4 million foreclosures that Treasury initially aimed 
to stop, and vastly fewer than the 8 to 13 million foreclosures expected 
by 2012.”64 In 2013, the National Consumer Law Center concluded 
that, “HAMP works well when it is implemented, but it is 
                                               
Family Servicing Guide is available at www.fanniemae.com/ 
content/guide/servicing/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GAE-KNWY?type= 
image]; periodic updates through Lender Announcements and Lender Letters 
are available at www.fanniemae.com/singlefamily/originating-underwriting 
[https://perma.cc/7BJU-UYZS?type=image]. Freddie’s Single-Family 
Seller/Servicer Guide is available at http://freddiemac.com/singlefamil 
y/guide [https://perma-archives.org/warc/ N2PU-TW9G/http://www. 
freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/]; it is brought up to date with Bulletins 
and Industry Letters, which are available at 
http://freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide [https://perma-archives.org/ 
warc/N2PU-TW9G/http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/] 
61 COMMITMENT TO PURCHASE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT AND SERVICER 
PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT, www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs /docs/ 
hamp_servicer/servicerparticipationagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/M39S-
EA84] (detailing the terms of servicer participation). 
62 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 8 (providing an 
overview of HAMP). 
63 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY & FANNIE MAE, supra note 11 (outlining the 
terms of the delegation of non-GSE HAMP implementation); U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREASURY & FREDDIE MAC, supra note 11 (outlining the terms of the 
delegation of non-GSE HAMP implementation); REPORT EVL-2011-003, 
supra note 11, at 12 (describing Fannie’s role as program administrator and 
Freddie’s as compliance enforcer); FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, 
at 14 (“Fannie Mae has assumed the role of MHA program administrator and 
Freddie Mac the role of MHA compliance agent.”). 
64 CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 21, at 4. 
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implemented for far too few homeowners.”65 The 2013 National 
Consumer Law Center report said that since September 2008, almost 
four million homes had been lost to foreclosure, that as of May 2012 
one million were in some stage of the foreclosure process, and that ten 
million more homes might be added, while “HAMP has reached only 
a small fraction of the homes entering foreclosure.”66 In 2013, the 
Ninth Circuit noted that, “the program seems to have created more 
litigation than it has happy homeowners.”67 In 2014, former Treasury 
Secretary Timothy Geithner acknowledged that earlier estimates about 
the number of homeowners who would be helped by HAMP had been 
“overly optimistic.”68 In July 2015, the Special Inspector General for 
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) reported that HAMP 
had been a massive failure, with servicers rejecting “four million 
borrowers’ requests for help, or 72 percent of their applications” and 
granting only 887,001 modifications in the six years of the program; it 
“appear[ed] that the program has allowed big banks to run roughshod 
over borrowers again and again.”69  
 The central reason for the failure of HAMP has been 
widespread defiance by servicers of the standards set for HAMP70 and 
                                               
65 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 12, at 26. 
66 Id. 
67 Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2013). 
68
 GEITHNER, supra note 1, at 302. 
69 Gretchen Morgenson, A Slack Lifeline for Drowning Homeowners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2015, at BU1. See generally SIGTARP, supra note 51 
(outlining the aftermath of HAMP). 
70 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 12, at 4 (stating that 
“HAMP’s failure to reach its intended scale has one root cause: massive 
servicer noncompliance. Almost every official evaluation of HAMP has 
noted widespread servicer noncompliance and the concurrent failure of the . 
. . Treasury . . . to engage in meaningful enforcement”). National Consumer 
Law Center emphasized that “[a]lmost every official evaluation of HAMP 
has noted poor servicer compliance. Judges reviewing servicer behavior in 
individual cases have been scathing.” Id. at 30; see also Young v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 224, 238 (1st Cir. 2013) (referencing the “bank’s 
dilatory and careless conduct,” which included “wrongly stating that [the 
homeowner] was ineligible for a permanent modification” and taking five 
months to correct the mistake); Charest v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 
3d 114, 126 (D. Mass. 2014) (stating that the servicer “required unnecessary 
information and documents it already possessed, miscalculated . . . income, 
repeatedly misrepresented . . . eligibility for a loan modification and denied 
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the lack of meaningful enforcement by either general monitoring or 
response to complaints, even when those complaints indicate the 
possibility of illegal activity.71 When homeowners have sought relief 
in court, courts usually have held that the question of compliance with 
HAMP cannot be raised in litigation. Courts have based these denials 
on a variety of theories—that there is no private right of action to 
                                               
applications based on incorrect facts”); Nathalie Martin & Max Weinstein, 
Addressing the Foreclosure Crisis Through Law School Clinics, 20 GEO. J. 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 531, 540 (2013) (describing “numerous, redundant 
requests for verification of borrower information” and initiative of 
foreclosure during modification); About the Settlement, JOINT STATE-
FEDERAL NAT’L MORTGAGE SERV. SETTLEMENTS, 
http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com/about [https://perma.cc/D9YN-
HBE2] (reporting on the February 2012 settlement of abusive servicing 
charges among a coalition of forty-nine state attorneys general, the U.S. 
Departments of Justice and of Housing and Urban Development, and the five 
largest mortgage servicers). 
71 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 12, at 30 (“[H]omeowners 
have been unable and Treasury unwilling to hold servicers accountable for 
performance or compliance with the program’s rules.”). National Consumer 
Law Center explained that “[a]lmost every official evaluation of HAMP has 
noted lack of enforcement by the Department of the Treasury and its agents.” 
Id. at 36; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-433, MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURES: DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REVEAL NEED FOR ONGOING 
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 1 (2011), http://www.gao.gov/new.items 
/d11433.pdf [http://perma.cc/DKV7-L7FW] (“Banking regulators conducted 
a coordinated review of 14 mortgage servicers and identified pervasive 
problems with their document preparation and oversight of foreclosure 
processes . . . .”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-367R, 
TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 5 (2011), http://www.gao. 
gov/new.items/d11367r.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9PT-PCT7] (reporting that a 
survey showed that 76% of responding housing counselors with the national 
foreclosure mitigation counseling program characterized borrowers’ 
experience with HAMP as negative or very negative, largely because of 
failure to enforce HAMP standards); JOHN RAO ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 
2.8.3.4.1, 2.8.3.4.3; Case Escalation, HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION 
PROGRAM, 
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/resources/advisors/escalation.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/K75L-46DR] (advising homeowners that if they consider 
denial of relief improper, they should first attempt to contact the servicer, and 
then contact one of several government hotlines). 
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enforce HAMP72 or that borrowers do not have third party beneficiary 
status to enforce the contracts between Fannie Mae and the servicers.73 
Some courts have, however, allowed state law contract, fraud, or 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices claims with respect to the Trial 
Period Plans.74 Courts rejecting judicial review have expressed 
concern about “opening the door to potentially 3-4 million 
homeowners filing individual claims75 and have justified the denial of 
judicial consideration of HAMP claims by asserting that claims under 
                                               
72 See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 555, 559 n.4 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“Courts have uniformly rejected [claims arising under HAMP] . . . 
because HAMP does not create a private federal right of action for borrowers 
against servicers.”); see also Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 717 F.3d 
224, 236 n.10 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting but not passing on the conclusion 
expressed in Wigod); Kozaryn v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 784 F. Supp. 
2d 100, 102 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing cases that deny a private right of 
action under HAMP). 
73 See Wigod, 673 F.3d at 559 n.4 (discussing cases and stating that district 
courts have “correctly . . . foreclose[d] claims by homeowners seeking HAMP 
modifications as third-party beneficiaries of SPAs”); Arthur B. Axelson & 
Heather C. Hutchings, Mortgage Servicing Developments, 68 BUS. LAW. 571, 
580-82 (2013) (discussing cases holding that borrowers do not have third-
party beneficiary status). 
74 Wigod, 673 F.3d at 574-76, 576 n.14 (allowing state law contract claims 
based on the TPP and discussing other cases); Corvello v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 728 F.3d 878, 883 (9th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with reasoning of Wigod); 
Young, 717 F.3d at 240-41 (noting that this claim “extends beyond the alleged 
breaches of the TPP and includes defendants’ handling of her entire case, 
beginning with the negotiations surrounding her forbearance agreement”); 
Charest v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 3d 114, 125-27 (D. Mass. 
2014) (discussing a possible cause of action under Section 93A); Okoye v. 
Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. 10-11563, 2011 WL 3269686, at *9 (D. Mass. July 
28, 2011) (dismissing due to failure to allege distinct damages). But see Miller 
v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012) (concluding 
that there is no implied right of action); Parent Pennington v. HSBC Bank 
USA, N.A., 493 Fed. Appx. 548, 553 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that there is no 
private right of action under HAMP). See generally Harry N. Arger & Brett 
J. Natarelli, Support for Dismissal of State Law Based HAMP TPP Cases, 
2013 BUS. L. TODAY (2013) (discussing Wigod, Miller, and Pennington). 
75 Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039, 2010 WL 2572988, at 
*4 (D. Ariz. 2010).  
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HAMP are “enforceable only through an administrative process.”76 In 
general, courts have not distinguished between loans held by private 
lenders and loans held by Fannie or Freddie. One decision explained: 
 
[B]orrowers denied a loan modification can 
contact the Homeowner’s HOPE Hotline 
and speak with a trained housing counselor 
regarding the HAMP program. If the 
counselor believes that the borrower’s 
application was improperly denied, the 
counselor can refer the concern to the 
servicer’s senior-level management. If that 
senior-level official cannot resolve the issue, 
the counselor can further escalate the case to 
a designated team at Fannie Mae whose 
responsibility includes resolving individual 
and systemic problems. In addition, to 
monitor participating servicers’ compliance 
with the HAMP, Freddie Mac, at the 
direction of Treasury, instituted a second-
look process in which it audits a sample of 
loan modification applications that have 
been denied to minimize the likelihood that 
borrower applications are overlooked or 
inadvertently denied. . . . Secretary of the 
Treasury issued S[upplemental] D[irective] 
09-06 which requires, in part, servicers to 
furnish Treasury and Fannie Mae with the 
specific reason for denial.77  
                                               
76 Wright v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 10-01723 JF (HRL), 2010 WL 
2889117, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  
77 Id. at *5 (quoting Williams v. Geithner, No. CIV.09-1959 ADM/JJG, 2009 
WL 3757380, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 9, 2009)); see also Marks, 2010 WL 
2572988, at *4,*6-7 (stating that “[c]ongressional intent expressly indicates 
that compliance authority was delegated solely to Freddie Mac” and that 
“legislative history indicates that the right to initiate a cause of action lies 
with the Secretary via the Administrative Procedure Act”); cf. Charest, 9 F. 
Supp. 3d at 136 (rejecting Fannie’s argument that an adequate remedy for 
servicer misconduct is the possibility of a suit by Treasury or Fannie against 
the servicer “for specific performance of contractual obligations relating to 
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A recent decision agrees that 
 
If there was a violation of federal law with 
respect to . . . handling of . . . HAMP 
requests, that is a matter better addressed by 
the U.S. Treasury Department as the 
administrator of that program. We cannot 
perceive that by enacting HAMP, the federal 
government intended for persons rejected 
for HAMP assistance to have a private cause 
of action against the mortgage lender or 
servicer . . . .78 
 
 There has been no effective “administrative process” at the 
Department of the Treasury, FHFA, Fannie, Freddie, or even the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. In general, these agencies 
leave the administration of HAMP entirely in the hands of the loan 
servicers and do not enforce the standards that theoretically bind the 
servicers. In July 2015, the Special Inspector General for the TARP 
said that “[w]e are constantly seeing problems with the way servicers 
are treating homeowners and not following the rules . . . . I don’t 
understand why there hasn’t been a stronger policing from Treasury 
on servicers.”79 Consumer advocates agree that “there is no effective 
appeals process.”80 
 Although FHFA, as it has acknowledged, “operates under a 
statutory mandate . . . to implement a plan aimed at maximizing 
                                               
HAMP violations”). The Charest court noted that Fannie “fails to attest or 
even represent that it will file such a suit.” Id. at 137 n.35. 
78 Jaffri v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 26 N.E. 3d 635, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2015) (citing, inter alia, Spaulding v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 714 F.3d 769 
(4th Cir. 2013)).  
79 Morgenson, supra note 68 (quoting Special Inspector General Christy L. 
Romero). 
80 NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 12, at 40 (stating that “Treasury 
created a weak appeals process for non-GSE loans” while for “GSE loans, 
homeowners . . . can call a general toll-free number” but staff who answers 
the telephone often cannot help and that advocates for homeowners with GSE 
loans sometimes try to use the non-GSE HAMP appeals process because the 
“limited appeals process built into HAMP is better than the nothing that exists 
elsewhere”). 
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assistance for homeowners in order to minimize foreclosures,”81 it has 
disclaimed responsibility for enforcing the HAMP standards. FHFA 
takes the position that Fannie and Freddie, “not FHFA, should handle 
complaints.”82 An audit by FHFA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) 
included a senior manager’s proposal that consumer complaints be met 
with “a stiffly worded” statement that the matter has been referred to 
“an appropriate party.”83 This would be followed by transmission of 
“the email trail to Fannie . . . and simply say we are passing along this 
communication for your information. You may take whatever action 
you deem appropriate. We plan no followup.”84 
 In response to the OIG draft audit report, FHFA told the OIG 
on June 6, 2011 that it agreed with the recommendation that it should 
“develop and implement written policies, procedures, and controls” 
with respect to consumer complaints, but that the written policy will 
be that FHFA will “redirect[] cases to an appropriate entity, while 
making clear that the agency has limited mandate and ability to impact 
the outcome of the vast majority of individual consumer issues.”85 In 
the wake of the audit report, FHFA has not changed its public 
statement that complaints should go to Fannie and Freddie, not to 
FHFA. It told the public that “[u]nder conservatorship, FHFA has 
delegated certain authorities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
including responsibility for day-to-day business operations. FHFA 
                                               
81 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 4; see also REPORT EVL-2011-
003, supra note 11, at 6 (“FHFA has statutory responsibilities under EESA to 
assist homeowners to avoid foreclosures and to coordinate within the federal 
government to improve loan modification and restructuring efforts.”). 
82 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY & OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT OF THE 
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY’S CONSUMER COMPLAINTS PROCESS 6 
(2011), http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/AUD-2011-001.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Z3ZL-ZBTQ] [hereinafter AUDIT REPORT]. The Audit 
Report suggests that the FHFA’s discussions may have been prompted by the 
OIG audit. Id. at 7 n.10. 
83 Id. at 5-6. 
84 Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 
85 Id. at 20-21. FHFA adds that “[i]n the event any trends can be discerned 
from the limited pool of inquiries that FHFA receives, the information 
received may be shared with the agency’s examination staff” and that the 
FHFA Office of General Counsel “will review identified consumer 
complaints alleging fraud to determine if appropriate action was taken or 
needs to be taken.” Id. at 21. FHFA conceded that during the audit period “no 
complaints were referred to law enforcement authorities.” Id. at 5. 
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generally does not intervene in matters involving individual 
mortgages, property sales or transfers, foreclosures, or other 
actions.”86 
 The OIG disagreed with FHFA’s limited view of its 
responsibilities with regard to consumer complaints, noting that, 
“pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B), FHFA has the authority to 
ensure that the Enterprises comply with FHFA’s rules, regulations, 
guidelines, and orders, and that they operate in a fashion consistent 
with the public interest.”87 FHFA apparently does not dispute this, but 
“delegates” its authority to the GSEs it controls. 
 FHFA’s “delegation” of enforcement to Fannie and Freddie is 
totally ineffective since Fannie and Freddie provide no forum for 
inviting, accepting, considering, or resolving homeowners’ 
complaints. Fannie and Freddie have no established process for 
considering homeowners’ claims that servicers are violating HAMP’s 
provisions or for entertaining homeowners’ requests that Fannie or 
Freddie exercise the considerable discretion the agencies have to 
provide relief from foreclosure. Homeowners who have access to the 
Internet may find their way to a page that advises the homeowner: 
 
All Fannie Mae homeowners have access to our 
Mortgage Help Network for free mortgage 
assistance provided by one of our national or 
community based nonprofit partners. You’ll work 
directly with a housing advisor who will review your 
                                               
86 Id. at 6 (quoting the FAQs then available on the Agency’s website). 
Although this sloughing off responsibility to Fannie and Freddie was 
criticized in the FHFA OIG’s Audit Report of June 21, 2011, this language 
on FHFA’s website remained almost unchanged. On November 29, 2015, the 
language was essentially the same, now reading: “[FHFA] ha[s] delegated 
certain authorities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, including responsibility 
for day-to-day operations, which involves the handling of consumer 
complaints. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac each have a review process to 
evaluate situations that arise involving their mortgages or property 
transactions.” Complaints, Concerns & Questions, FED. HOUSING FIN. 
AGENCY, http://www.fhfa.gov/Homeownersbuyer/MortgageAssistance /Pa 
ges/ComplaintsConcernsQuestions.aspx [https://perma.cc/6YAW-WEWS? 
type=source]. FHFA has not determined what if any “role it should play in 
overseeing the . . . resolution of complaints” by Fannie and Freddie. AUDIT 
REPORT, supra note 82, at 6. 
87 Id. at 22. 
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situation, explain your options, and work with your 
mortgage company throughout the process.88 
      
 FHFA acknowledges that the loan modification practices of 
Fannie and Freddie are critically important to the taxpayers as well as 
homeowners.89 FHFA states that it “supervises and oversees the 
Enterprises’ compliance with and performance and payments under 
the agreements with Treasury, as well as the Enterprises’ adoption of 
MHA-related loss mitigation programs.”90 Nonetheless, although 
Fannie and Freddie have promulgated standards governing the 
provision of HAMP relief, neither FHFA, Fannie, nor Freddie has 
provided any internal administrative process for allowing or reviewing 
appeals from servicers’ decisions or for handling complaints by 
consumers, even for mortgages owned by Fannie or Freddie. Indeed, 
a June 2011 Audit Report by the OIG of FHFA specifically criticized 
FHFA for not having “a sound internal control environment governing 
consumer complaints, including formal policies and procedures for 
complaints received by FHFA and the Enterprises.”91 The OIG noted 
that FHFA “did not refer potentially criminal allegations to law 
enforcement authorities.”92 Moreover, “[a]lthough FHFA’s standard 
referral letter to [Fannie and Freddie] requested copies of disposition 
documentation . . . . Of the 470 complaints referred . . . FHFA actually 
                                               
88 Know Your Options, FANNIE MAE, http://www.knowyouroptions.com 
/find-resources/mortgage-assistance/fannie-mae-mortgage-help-network 
[https://perma.cc/8FRF-PMLB]. The inadequacy of the consumer complaint 
process is not unique to FHFA. See ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING 
CHANCE 183-84 (2014) (discussing problems with consumer complaint 
departments). 
89 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 4 (“The Enterprises’ loan 
modification efforts are critical to minimizing their credit losses, because a 
loan modification is often a lower cost resolution to a delinquent mortgage 
than foreclosure. . . . loan modification efforts also help restore stability to the 
housing market, which directly benefits the Enterprises by reducing credit 
exposure.”). 
90 Id. at 5. The report adds that “FHFA’s focus has been on how the 
Enterprises’ obligations and performance . . . affect their safety and soundness 
and their consistency with the conservatorship goals of preserving and 
conserving assets.” Id. 
91 AUDIT REPORT, supra note 82, at 1. 
92 Id.  
 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW VOL. 35 
 
 
188 
obtained all correspondence and disposition documentation in only 2 
instances.”93 
 FHFA did not know the total number of consumer complaints 
it received, though it conceded that it had received an “increased 
number of repeat complaints and increased number of consumers who 
claim Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are not responsive.”94 The 
complaints included allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse, including 
potential criminal activity.95 “Many of these allegations involved 
possible improper foreclosure actions on single family residential 
mortgages, which is an area of considerable risk because of the 
potential adverse impact on the consumer,” the OIG Audit Report 
stated.96 Some of these complaints included “more than a year’s worth 
of written correspondence and documentation, sometimes including 
complete loan packages.”97 The OIG concluded that “FHFA tolerated 
an inefficient, decentralized complaints process” and therefore “lost 
track of more than two years of written, telephone, and email 
complaints and lacks assurance regarding the adequacy of 
responses.”98 
 FHFA said that it would, by December 31, 2011, “develop and 
implement written policies, procedures, and controls to address the 
receipt, processing, and disposition of consumer 
                                               
93 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
94 Id. at 2-3. FHFA told the OIG that it “began to receive an elevated level of 
public inquires and complaints” after 2008, and that the “volume of calls and 
inquiries further increased upon deployment of” the HAMP program in mid-
2009. Id. at 19. 
95 Id. at 2 (“For purposes of this report, consumer complaints include, but are 
not limited to, those involving allegations of fraud, waste, or abuse.”). Of the 
email complaints FHFA produced for the Inspector General, 95 alleged fraud 
or improper mortgage foreclosure or both. Id. at 10. 
96 Id. at 3. 
97 Id. at 10. 
98 Id.  
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inquiries.”99 What FHFA has done, however, is to reassert that 
complaints are to be handled by Fannie and Freddie themselves.100 
 In 2013, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) 
promulgated Mortgage Servicing Rules that became effective in 
January 2014.101 “FHFA . . . required” Fannie and Freddie “to update 
their servicing requirements . . . to be consistent with” these Servicing 
Regulations.102 These rules require servicers to “exercise reasonable 
                                               
99
 Id. at 22-23. FHFA told the OIG “that the established, informal complaints 
process was expected to be temporary in nature and was not integral to the 
core regulatory responsibilities of the Agency.” Id. at 22. FHFA also told the 
OIG “that it has a limited mandate regarding consumer complaints.” Id. The 
OIG, however, responded that “pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 4513(a)(1)(B), FHFA 
has the authority to ensure that the Enterprises comply with FHFA’s rules, 
regulations, guidelines, and orders, and that they operate in a fashion 
consistent with the public interest. FHFA—in its discretion—decided to 
implement this authority to handle consumer complaints.” Id. 
100 Complaints, Concerns & Questions, supra note 86. 
101 Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act (Regulation B), Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X), and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 
60,382 (Oct. 1, 2013) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002, 1024, and 1026); 
Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X), and Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Truth in Lending 
Act (Regulation Z) 78 Fed. Reg. 10,696, 10,902 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be 
codified as 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024 and 1026); see Axelson & Hutchings, supra 
note 72, at 575-80 (discussing the proposed rules). In December 2014, CFPB 
proposed further amendments to these rules: Amendments to the 2013 
Mortgage Rules under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation 
X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 79 Fed. Reg. 74,176 (Dec. 
15, 2014) (to be codified as 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024 and 1026). The official name 
of the agency is the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, but it and 
others refer to it as the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or CFPB. 
102 FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2014), 
http://www.fhfa.gov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/FHFA_ 
2013_Report_to_Congress.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KHJ-UJJH?type=source]. 
See generally FANNIE MAE, SERVICING GUIDE ANNOUNCEMENT SVC-2013-
20 (2013), https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/svc1320.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P9HV-HG3G] (explaining updates in servicing 
requirements related to the CFPB’s mortgage servicing rules); FREDDIE MAC, 
UPDATES IN RESPONSE TO THE CFPB MORTGAGE SERVICING FINAL RULE, 
BULL. NO. 2013-21 (2013), http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily 
/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll1321.pdf [http://perma.cc/23ZD-PERM] (explaining 
updates in response to the CFPB’s mortgage servicing rules. 
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diligence in obtaining documents and information to complete a loss 
mitigation application[,]”103 and detail specific steps that a servicer 
shall take, and set deadlines for doing so.104      
 The rules provide that under specified circumstances servicers 
must allow homeowners to appeal denials of loan modifications; the 
appeals are made to the servicer, but are to be reviewed by personnel 
different from those who made the original denial.105 The rules specify 
that “[a] servicer’s determination [of the appeal] is not subject to any 
further appeal.”106 The CFPB rules also provide that  
 
A borrower may enforce the provisions of 
this section pursuant to section 6(f) of 
RESPA (12 U.S.C. 2605(f)). Nothing in § 
1024.41 imposes a duty on a servicer to 
provide any borrower with any specific loss 
mitigation option. Nothing in § 1024.41 
should be construed to create a right for a 
borrower to enforce the terms of any 
agreement between a servicer and the owner 
or assignee of a mortgage loan, including 
with respect to the evaluation for, or offer of, 
any loss mitigation option or to eliminate 
any such right that may exist pursuant to 
applicable law.107   
         
The first sentence of this section appears to create a private right of 
action to enforce these loss mitigation rules, but the cause of action 
seems to be limited to enforcing the procedures specified in the rule, 
not the substance of any decision.108 The only relief available under 
                                               
103 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(b)(1) (2015). 
104 12 C.F.R. § 1024.38(a). 
105 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(c)(ii) (requiring each servicer to notify each borrower 
“that the borrower has the right to appeal the denial of any loan modification 
option as well as the amount of time the borrower has to file such an appeal 
and any requirements for making an appeal”). 
106 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(h)(4). 
107 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(a). 
108 See Cataldi v. New York Cmty. Bank, No. 1:13-CV-3972-RWS-JSA, 
2014 WL 359954, *2 (N.D. Ga 2014); Laura M. Greco & Lauren E. Campisi, 
Understanding CFPB’s Final Mortgage Servicing Rules and their Impact on 
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RESPA is damages, not injunctive relief, and the damages are limited 
to $2000 per person.109 Moreover, some important provisions of the 
CFPB rules are not made privately enforceable at all.110 
 There has been regulatory action to enforce the mortgage 
servicing rules. In September 2014, the CFPB acted against Flagstar 
Bank, requiring the bank to pay $27.5 million to approximately 6,500 
consumers who had been injured by Flagstar’s actions.111 In April 
2015, 
CFPB and the Federal Trade Commission took enforcement action 
against another servicer, Green Tree.112  
 The promulgation of the rules and agency enforcement actions 
have not ended widespread servicer violation of the rules.113 Indeed, 
                                               
Foreclosures and Bankruptcies, 131 BANKING L.J. 165, 174-76 (2014). The 
commentators, however, stated that the Dodd-Frank Act, which created the 
CFPB, “does not specifically regulate loss mitigation activities at all.” Id. at 
174; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (doubting the 
ability of an agency to create a private right of action by regulation if the 
private right of action has not been created by the statute).  
109 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) 
(2012).  
110 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., COMMENTS TO THE CFPB REGARDING 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 2013 MORTGAGE RULES UNDER THE REAL ESTATE 
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT AND THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 9 (2015), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/rulemaking/comments-servicing-cfpb-
march16-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCM3-3KCG] [hereinafter NCLC 
COMMENTS] (“[T]he provisions of § 1024.38 are not privately enforceable.”). 
111 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Takes Action Against Flagstar 
Bank for Violating New Mortgage Servicing, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION 
BUREAU (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
newsroom/cfpb-takes-action-against-flagstar-bank-for-violating-new-
mortgage-servicing-rules/ [https://perma.cc/8N96-HG3J?type=source].  
112 National Mortgage Servicing Company Will Pay $63 Million to Settle 
FTC, CFPB Charges, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Apr. 21, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/04/national-mortgage-
servicing-company-will-pay-63-million-settle [https://perma.cc/G9T8-8F72 
?type=source]. 
113 See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., NCLC SURVEY REVEALS ONGOING 
PROBLEMS WITH MORTGAGE SERVICING 1 (2015), http://www.nclc.org/ 
images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mortgage_servicing/ib-servicing-issues-
2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/VDG7-ZTG9] (“While the CFPB’s mortgage 
servicing regulations have made important progress in standardizing industry 
practices, enhancing procedural transparency, and improving servicer 
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in June 2015, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency reported 
that six banks, including Wells Fargo and JPMorgan, which have the 
largest servicing portfolios in the United States, have failed to correct 
errors they agreed in 2011 to remedy.114 As the National Consumer 
Law Center and others have pointed out, the CFPB’s enforcement 
authority “is necessarily limited by resources as well as delayed from 
the time at which a homeowner needs the servicer to act in order to 
prevent foreclosure.”115 Therefore, the availability of a cause of action 
under the APA continues to be important to homeowners challenging 
denials of modifications for mortgages held by Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac.116   
 
III. FHFA is a Federal Agency Subject to the APA; There is 
No Preclusion of Judicial Review and No Bar to Granting 
Injunctive Relief for Homeowners who Prove Injury 
Caused by Denials of Mortgage Modifications for 
Mortgages Owned, Securitized, or Guaranteed by Fannie 
or Freddie 
 
 HAMP was created by the Treasury Department to be 
administered by entities—Fannie and Freddie—that had been put 
                                               
accountability, many challenges remain.”); NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA AND 
NAT’L HOUS. RESOURCE CTR., ARE MORTGAGE SERVICERS FOLLOWING THE 
NEW RULES? A SNAPSHOT OF COMPLIANCE WITH CFPB SERVICING 
STANDARDS 2 (2015), http://www.nclr.org/images/uploads /publications/ 
mortgageservicesreport 11215.pdf [http://perma.cc/WYQ4-FKDE] (“The 
survey results show that aspects of the rules substantially mitigated bad 
practices in mortgage servicing, while other servicing practices still need 
improvement.”); NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 110, at 6-7, 10 (detailing the 
various types of servicer noncompliance). 
114 Nathaniel Popper, Banks That Failed to Fix Mortgage Services Face 
Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2015, at B5; Correcting Foreclosure 
Practices, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY (June 17, 2015), 
http://www.occ.gov/topics/consumer-protection/foreclosure-
prevention/correcting-foreclosure-practices.html [https://perma.cc/L3JU-C 
278]. 
115 NCLC COMMENTS, supra note 110, at 10. 
116 Id. (“The CFPB has recognized the important of private enforceability by 
making most sections of its mortgage servicing rules privately enforceable. 
Protections for successors should be no exception.”). 
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under the absolute and total dominion of FHFA.117 FHFA has entire 
control over whether and in what ways the GSEs participate in 
HAMP.118 Thus, to take a pertinent example, on May 8, 2015, the 
Director of FHFA announced that “FHFA has decided to extend the 
Enterprises’ participation in the Home Affordable Modification 
Program (HAMP) and the Home Affordable Refinance Program 
(HARP) for an additional year, until the end of 2016.”119 While the 
servicers who administer GSE HAMP have been said to be agents of 
Fannie or Freddie, those servicers are in reality agents of FHFA.120 
When a modification is denied by a servicer who is an agent of FHFA, 
the denial is FHFA’s.  
 There is no doubt that FHFA is an agency subject to the 
APA.121 Prima facie, this means that homeowners denied 
modifications with respect to loans held by Fannie and Freddie are 
entitled to judicial review under § 702 of the APA, which provides that 
“[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is 
entitled to judicial review thereof.”122 There is a strong presumption 
that judicial review is available: as the Supreme Court wrote in Abbott 
Laboratories v. Gardner, “judicial review of a final agency action by 
an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive 
reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress.”123 The only 
                                               
117 See supra notes 47-51 and the accompanying text.  
118 Id.  
119 Watt, supra note 48 (announcing also that “this will be the final extension 
that FHFA will make for the Enterprises’ participation in HAMP”). 
120 See Charest v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 3d 114, 127 (D. Mass. 
2014) (stating that the servicer of a mortgage held by Fannie is an agent of 
Fannie); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 
2006); supra notes 10, 19 and the accompanying text (discussing FHFA’s 
control over the servicers with respect to the administration of HAMP and 
other loss mitigation programs).  
121 See 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a) (2012) (“There is established the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency, which shall be an independent agency of the Federal 
Government.”); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012) 
(defining agency).  
122 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
123 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967); see also Bowen v. 
Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986) (stating that 
Chief Justice Marshall “insisted that ‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty 
certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of 
the laws’” (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)). 
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exceptions to this are when “agency action is committed to agency 
discretion by law” and when “statutes preclude judicial review.”124 
 Agency action is generally considered “committed to agency 
discretion by law” only “in those rare instances where ‘statutes are 
drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to 
apply.’”125 While the § 701(a)(2) is not pellucid, the statutes governing 
mortgage servicing and underlying HAMP and the agency directives 
governing loss mitigation procedures provide “meaningful standard[s] 
against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”126 Section 
701(a)(2), therefore, does not seem to be a bar to review of mortgage 
modification denials under GSE HAMP.    
 Statutory preclusion under §701(a)(1), however, requires 
further discussion. The standards governing statutory preclusion are 
well established. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the APA’s 
“‘generous review provisions’ must be given a ‘hospitable’ 
interpretation . . . [and] only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing 
evidence’ of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict 
access to judicial review.”127 The Court has admonished that “where 
substantial doubt about the congressional intent exists, the general 
presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action is 
controlling.”128   
 While APA review of GSE mortgage modification decisions 
seems not to have been raised in litigation, there are decisions in other 
kinds of cases brought under HERA that suggest that judicial review 
of FHFA’s actions may be precluded by 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f), which 
                                               
124 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1-2). 
125 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong. 26 (1945)); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 
592, 599 (1988). But see Webster, 486 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“‘Commit[ment] to agency discretion by law’ includes, but is not limited to, 
situations in which there is ‘no law to apply.’”). 
126 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985); see also Massachusetts v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (“[A]n agency has broad 
discretion to choose how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel 
to carry out its delegated responsibilities.”). 
127 Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140-41 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 
U.S. 48, 51 (1955) and Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)); see also 
Bowen, 476 U.S. at 670-73 (stating that there is a “strong presumption that 
Congress intends judicial review of administrative action”). 
128 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 682 n.3 (quoting Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 
U.S. 340, 350-51 (1984)). 
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says that “[e]xcept as provided in this section or at the request of the 
Director, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise 
of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.”129 
The discussion below considers whether proponents of this position 
could “discharge[] ‘the heavy burden of overcoming the strong 
presumption that Congress did not mean to prohibit all judicial 
review’” of mortgage modification denials made on behalf of 
FHFA.130 Section A discusses the pertinent provisions of HERA; 
section B, the recent FHFA cases; and section C, the seminal Supreme 
Court ruling, Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings and 
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).131 Section D analyzes this 
material and concludes that HERA does not preclude judicial review 
of or limit injunctive relief for denials of mortgage modifications 
under GSE HAMP. 
  
A. HERA’s Provisions With Regard to Judicial 
Review 
  
 HERA has several provisions regarding judicial review, 
largely copied from FIRREA. Some of them deal only with FHFA as 
receiver, a situation that does not exist.132 Thus, for example, in § 
4617(b)(5), which deals with the authority of the receiver to determine 
claims, subsection (5)(D) gives the receiver authority to disallow 
claims and subsection (5)(E) precludes judicial review of agency 
determinations under (5)(D); § 4617(b)(6) provides for judicial 
determination of claims.133 But all of § 4617(b)(5) and (6) deal with 
receivership only, not conservatorship, and receivership only is 
addressed by § 4617(b)(11)(D), which provides that 
     
Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction 
over— 
 
                                               
129 HERA § 1145(a), 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012). 
130 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 672 (quoting Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 
(1975)). 
131 489 U.S. 561 (1989). 
132 See supra notes 38-39 and the accompanying text. 
133 12 U.S.C. §4617(b). 
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  (i) any claim or action for payment 
from or any action seeking a determination 
of rights with respect to the assets or charter 
of any regulated entity for which the Agency 
has been appointed receiver, or 
 
  (ii) any claim relating to any act or 
omission of such regulated entity or the 
Agency as receiver.134 
 
 With respect to conservatorship, there is no preclusion of 
judicial review.135 Indeed, HERA has several provisions expressly 
authorizing judicial review under conservatorship. A regulated entity 
can secure judicial review of the decision to appoint the Agency as 
conservator or receiver.136 Furthermore,  
 
After the appointment of a conservator . . ., 
the conservator . . . may, in any judicial 
action or proceeding to which such regulated 
entity is or becomes a party, request a stay 
for a period not to exceed– 
 
   (i) 45 days, in the case of any conservator . . . .137 
 
And § 4617(b)(10)(B) directs that “any court with jurisdiction of such 
action or proceeding . . . shall grant such stay.”138 Section 
4617(b)(18)(A) discusses payment of “any final and unappealable 
judgment for monetary damages entered against the conservator or 
receiver for the breach of an agreement executed or approved in 
writing by the conservator or receiver . . . .”139  
Most significantly, with respect to current litigation, § 4617(f) 
provides that “[e]xcept as provided in this section or at the request of 
                                               
134 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(11)(D). Section 4617(d)(8)(B) “Certain qualified 
financial contracts” also refers to “any judicial action or proceeding brought 
against any receiver . . ..” 
135 Contra 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(11)(D). 
136 § 4617(a)(5).  
137 § 4617(b)(10)(A). 
138 § 4617(b)(10)(B). 
139 § 4617(b)(18)(A). 
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the Director, no court may take any action to restrain or affect the 
exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a 
receiver.”140 
 
 Thus, HERA treats conservatorship very differently from 
receivership. This is not surprising, as FIRREA and HERA define the 
agencies’ duties very differently in each capacity.141 For FHFA as 
conservator, there is no preclusion of judicial review, though there is 
the “anti-injunction” language of § 4617(f). 
 
B.  The FHFA Cases 
 
 While several cases have interpreted the “anti-injunction” 
language of § 4617(f), most of those that have reached the courts of 
appeals involve “PACE”—Property Assessed Clean Energy—
programs created by some local governments to provide financing for 
environmentally beneficial home improvements.142 Homeowners have 
to repay this financing, and some of these programs make the local 
                                               
140 § 4617(f). 
141 See Homeland Stores v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 17 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (stating that FIRREA “defines the RTC’s duties as conservator and 
as receiver differently” and concluding that actions taken under RTC’s 
powers as conservator are not within the jurisdictional bar applied to 
receivership); James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (“The principal difference between a conservator and receiver is that a 
conservator may operate and dispose of a bank as a going concern, while a 
receiver has the power to liquidate and wind up the affairs of an institution.”). 
142 County of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 988 (9th Cir. 
2013) (holding that FHFA’s directive to Freddie Mae and Freddie Mac 
regarding PACE liens was insulated from judicial review and not subject to 
APA rulemaking requirements); Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 
699 F.3d 221, 228 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding in part that the FHFA’s regulation 
of PACE programs was not subject to judicial review due to the agency’s 
status as conservator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pursuant to HERA); 
Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273, 1273 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that FHFA’s directive to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac not to 
purchase mortgages for properties with PACE liens was insulated from 
judicial review). A different issue involving § 4617(f) was addressed in In re 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Derivative Litigation, 643 F. 
Supp. 2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d per curiam sub nom. La. Mun. 
Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 434 F. App’x 188, 190 (4th 
Cir. 2011). 
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government’s lien for repayment superior to any other lien, including 
pre-existing mortgage liens.143 After FHFA imposed the 
conservatorship on Fannie and Freddie, it issued a Directive 
instructing Fannie and Freddie to protect themselves against risks from 
such first-lien PACE programs.144 Fannie and Freddie then declared 
that they would no longer purchase mortgages on properties subject to 
first lien PACE obligations, and FHFA then directed Fannie and 
Freddie to “continue to refrain” from purchasing such mortgages.145 
Several local governments and environmental groups challenged these 
actions on various grounds, but the courts of appeals that have 
considered the question—the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits—
have held that judicial review is precluded by § 4617(f) (HERA).146    
As all these decisions recognized, and as the Second Circuit 
said explicitly in the first of these cases, Town of Babylon v. Federal 
Housing Finance Agency, § 4617(f) (HERA) derives from “a virtually 
identical” provision of § 1821(j) (FIRREA), which governed 
receiverships by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) 
and Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) over failing private 
depository institutions, particularly savings and loan (S&L) 
associations.147 In Town of Babylon, the Second Circuit relied on its 
                                               
143 Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 225 (explaining that, for repayment 
purposes, liens from PACE programs have “priority over any other lien 
attached to the property, including new and preexisting mortgage liens”). 
144 Id. at 225-26 (reciting that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should “take 
prudential actions . . . to protect themselves against safety and soundness 
concerns—risks—raised by PACE programs”). 
145 Id. at 226 (“[T]he FHFA . . . directed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
‘continue to refrain from purchasing new mortgage loans secured by 
properties with outstanding first-lien PACE obligations,’ and ‘undertake 
other steps as may be necessary to protect their safe and sound operations 
from these first-lien PACE programs.’”). 
146 Id. at 222 (holding that the “federal statute addressing FHFA’s powers as 
conservator did not authorize judicial review” of FHFA’s directive to Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac); Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1273 (holding that FHFA’s 
directive was “insulated from judicial review”); County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d 
at 988 (holding that FHFA’s directive was “not subject to judicial review” or 
APA rulemaking requirements). 
147 Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 228 (citing Volges v. Resolution Tr. Co., 32 
F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1994) (comparing § 4617(f) to a “virtually identical 
jurisdictional bar” in the FIRREA)); see Costa v. Resolution Tr. Co., 789 F. 
Supp. 43, 45 (D. Mass. 1991) (explaining that although the language of the 
2015-2016              SECURING JUDICIAL REVIEW  
 
 
199 
decision in Volges v. Resolution Trust Corp., which interpreted § 
1821(j).148 In Volges, the Second Circuit had recognized, as all courts 
did, that the test of § 1821(j) (FIRREA) was whether the agency was 
“asserting some power beyond those granted to it as a conservator.”149 
In Town of Babylon, the Second Circuit concluded with respect to 
PACE that “[d]irecting protective measures against perceived risks is 
squarely within FHFA’s powers as a conservator.”150 
In the Eleventh Circuit’s PACE decision, Leon County v. 
Federal Housing Finance Agency, addressing the argument that 
FHFA’s action had been taken as regulator, not as conservator, the 
court emphasized the seriousness of a preclusion of judicial review, 
stating “[t]he FHFA cannot evade judicial scrutiny by merely labeling 
its actions with a conservator stamp. . . . . Moreover, ‘if the FHFA 
were to act beyond statutory or constitutional bounds in a manner that 
adversely impacted the rights of others, § 4617(f) would not bar 
judicial oversight or review of its actions.’”151 
 In Leon County, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that FHFA’s 
directive was an act of conservatorship, not regulation, because  
                                               
statute specifies only the FDIC, the anti-injunction language applies also to 
the RTC because 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4) gives the RTC the same powers 
and rights with respect to depository institutions insured by the FSLIC before 
the enactment of FIRREA as the FDIC has with respect to insured depository 
institutions under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act); Richard B. Gallagher, 
Annotation, Construction and Application of Anti-Injunction Provision of 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) (12 
USCS §1821(j)), 126 A.L.R. Fed. 43, 54 n.9 (1995) (discussing Costa). 
FIRREA provides that “except as provided in this section, no court may take 
any action, except at the request of the Board of Directors by regulation or 
order, to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] 
as a conservator or a receiver.” 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (2012). 
148 Volges, 32 F.3d 52-53 (quoting Costa, 789 F. Supp. at 45).  
149 Id. (discussing “the difference between the exercise of a function or power 
that is clearly outside the statutory authority of the RTC on the one hand, and 
improperly or even unlawfully exercising a function or power that is clearly 
authorized by statute on the other”). 
150 Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 227. 
151 Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 
2012) (quoting In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. Derivative Litig., 643 F. 
Supp. 2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d per curiam sub nom. La. Mun. 
Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 434 F. App 188 (4th Cir. 
2011)). 
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the powers of the directors, officers, and 
shareholders of the entity in conservatorship 
are transferred to the conservator, and those 
powers include marshalling, protecting, and 
managing assets. Part of managing the assets 
and assuring the solvency of a mortgage-
purchasing entity is considering the degree 
of risk entailed by the acquisition of 
particular mortgages. It is fully within the 
responsibilities of a protective conservator, 
acting as a prudent business manager, to 
decline to purchase a mortgage when its lien 
will be relegated to an inferior position for 
repayment.152 
 
 In the third of the PACE appellate decisions, County of 
Sonoma v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Ninth Circuit said 
the question was “whether FHFA’s directive to the Enterprises to 
discontinue purchasing PACE-encumbered mortgages is a lawful 
exercise of its authority as conservator of the Enterprises—rather than, 
as the district court concluded, an improper exercise of its power as a 
regulator.”153 As had the Eleventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit 
recognized “that FHFA’s power has limits”–“FHFA cannot evade 
judicial review and the APA’s requirements . . . simply by invoking its 
authority as conservator.”154 The court acknowledged that “the anti-
judicial review provision is inapplicable when FHFA acts beyond the 
scope of its conservator power.”155 The court held, however, that 
“FHFA’s decision to cease purchasing mortgages on PACE-
encumbered properties is a lawful exercise of its statutory authority as 
conservator . . . .”156 
                                               
152 Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278-79. 
153 County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d at 992. 
154 Id. at 994 (referring to APA’s rulemaking requirements). 
155 Id. at 992 (citing Sharpe v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 126 F.3d 1147, 1155 
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that statutory limitations on judicial review of 
FDIC’s actions in a capacity of a conservator or receiver do not preclude 
“injunctive relief when the FDIC has acted beyond, or contrary to, its 
statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted, powers or functions”)). 
156 County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d at 989. 
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 Several district court decisions also interpret § 4617(f) 
(HERA) in similar ways, sometimes drawing on cases interpreting § 
1821(j) (FIRREA).157 Two cases that contain some analysis of that 
section are Perry Capital LLC v. Lew158and Massachusetts v. Federal 
Housing Finance Agency.159 
 In Perry Capital, investors sued FHFA and Treasury for losses 
in the value of the investors’ stock in Fannie and Freddie because of 
the 2012 Third Amendment to the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreements (PSPAs) between Treasury and the GSEs.160 The district 
court held that § 4617(f) (HERA) barred all claims for declaratory, 
injunctive, or other equitable relief.161 Drawing on cases interpreting 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (FIRREA) the court held that the critical question 
was whether “plaintiffs sufficiently plead that FHFA acted beyond the 
scope of its statutory ‘powers or functions . . . as a conservator” in 
executing the Third Amendment.162 The court held that plaintiffs had 
not carried that burden, as FHFA actions were within “FHFA’s 
uncontested authority to determine how to conserve the viability of the 
GSEs,” a classic conservatorship function.163 
 In Massachusetts v. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 
Massachusetts maintained that FHFA’s “Arms-Length Transaction” 
and “Make-Whole” restrictions on sales of pre- and post-foreclosure 
homes violated the Non-profit Buyback Provisions of the 
Massachusetts Foreclosure Law.164 Relying on the PACE cases, FHFA 
argued that the anti-injunction provision of HERA barred relief 
because FHFA’s restrictions were “within the scope of its powers and 
duty as conservator to ‘preserve and conserve’ the GSEs’ assets.”165 
                                               
157 See, e.g., Gail C. Sweeney Estate Marital Tr. v. U.S. Treasury, 68 F. Supp. 
3d 116, 125 (D.D.C. 2014) (describing the “anti-injunction provision” as one 
that “strips courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to the ‘lawful exercise of 
FHFA’s power as conservator’”); Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 
208, 221 (D.D.C. 2014); Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 F. 
Supp. 3d 94, 101-02 (D. Mass. 2014); Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. 
Corp., 674 F. Supp. 2d 483 passim (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
158 70 F. Supp. 3d 208 (D.D.C. 2014). 
159 54 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. Mass. 2014).   
160 Perry Capital LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 223. 
161 Id. at 222. 
162 Id. at 221. 
163 Id. at 223. 
164 54 F. Supp. 3d 94 (D. Mass. 2014).   
165 Id. at 97. 
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 As in Perry, the district court acknowledged that “FHFA 
cannot evade judicial scrutiny by merely labeling its actions with a 
conservator stamp.”166 The court noted that FHFA as regulator must 
follow the notice and comment requirements of the APA.167 
Massachusetts argued that FHFA’s restrictions bore the characteristics 
of rulemaking “because they apply willy-nilly to all pre-foreclosure 
and REO [real estate owned] sales.”168 FHFA maintained that the 
directives were “‘protective measures against perceived risks [that 
fall] squarely within FHFA’s power as conservator.’”169    
 The district court held that FHFA’s “Arms-Length 
Transaction” and “Make-Whole” restrictions satisfied the judicial 
standards for conservatorship actions: “directive[s] to an institution in 
conservatorship to mitigate or avoid a perceived financial risk”; 
“discreet management decision[s] by a conservator”; actions that 
“evaluate[] the risks of certain business transactions and take[] 
prudential action to avoid those that it deems undesirable.”170 The 
court concluded that FHFA’s decision to reject the provisions of the 
state law “may be fairly characterized as a business judgment intended 
to ‘preserve and conserve [the GSEs’] assets and property’” and 
therefore within the protection of the anti-injunction provision of § 
4617(f) (HERA).171 
 
C. Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. 
                                               
166 Id. at 99 (“The Commonwealth is certainly correct in its assertion that that 
‘[t]he FHFA cannot evade judicial scrutiny by merely labeling its actions with 
a conservator stamp.’” (quoting Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 
F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
167 Id. at 100 n.5 (“When the FHFA promulgates rules in its role as the GSEs’ 
regulator, it must adhere to the notice and public comment requirements of 
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.”).  
168 Id. at 100 (“The Commonwealth argues that the ALT and Make–Whole 
restrictions bear the stigma of broad rulemaking because they apply willy-
nilly to all pre-foreclosure and REO sales.”). 
169 Id. (quoting Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221, 
227 (2d. Cir. 2012)). 
170 Id. (quoting Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 227-28). 
171 Id. at 100-02 (highlighting Congress’ decision to remove the power to 
second-guess the FHFA’s business judgment from the purview of the court); 
see also Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
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 The Supreme Court decision that is central to understanding § 
4617(f) (HERA) is Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp.172 Coit involved the anti-injunction 
language of the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 (FISA), 
12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C), which became § 1821(j) (FIRREA) and 
then § 4617(f) (HERA).173  
 FISA authorized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, acting 
ex parte and without notice, to appoint a conservator or receiver for a 
savings and loan association; FISA also allowed the affected savings 
and loan association to, “within 30 days, bring an action . . . ‘for an 
order requiring the Board to remove such conservator or receiver.’”174 
It was, the Supreme Court said, “in this context” that the anti-
injunction language “first appeared,” as 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C), 
stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court 
may take any action for or toward the removal of any conservator or 
receiver, or, except at the instance of the Board, restrain or affect the 
exercise of powers or functions of a conservator or receiver.”175 
 In this case, Coit had sued FirstSouth, a savings and loan 
association, in state court, seeking damages and declaratory relief.176 
Two months later, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board declared 
FirstSouth insolvent and appointed the FSLIC receiver.177 FSLIC 
                                               
172 489 U.S. 561 (1989). 
173 Id. at 570-71. For cases in which the interpretation of § 1464(d)(6)(C) 
(FISA) has been applied in cases involving FIRREA, see National Trust for 
Historic Preservation v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., 21 F.3d 469, 471 
n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United Liberty Life Insurance Corp. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d 
1320, 1328-29 (6th Cir. 1993), on remand, motion granted on other grounds, 
149 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
174 Coit, 489 U.S. at 570 (quoting Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 
1966 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 89-695, § 101, 80 Stat. 1028, 1033 (1966)). 
175 Id. at 571 (quoting FISA § 101, 80 Stat. at 1033). It is important to note 
that, in its original form and subsequently, the “anti-injunction” language was 
not absolute; it applied only to relief sought in forms other than what was 
“otherwise provided” in the legislation. The same is true of subsequent 
versions of the language, including § 4617(f) (HERA), which provides that 
“Except as provided in this section or at the request of the Director, no court 
may take any action, etc.” 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012) (emphasis added). The 
same is true of the “jurisdictional bar” language. § 4617(b)(2)(D)(ii). 
176 Coit, 489 U.S. at 565.  
177 Id.  
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removed Coit’s case to federal district court and moved to dismiss for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.178 The district court granted the 
motion on the basis of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in North Mississippi 
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Hudspeth.179  
 The Hudspeth decision was based on two statutory provisions: 
12 U.S.C. § 1729(d), which gave FSLIC as receiver power “to settle, 
compromise, or release claims in favor of or against the insured 
institutions,” and § 1464(d)(6)(C), the anti-injunction language.180 
Interpreting these two provisions, the Fifth Circuit concluded that 
FSLIC was authorized to adjudicate claims against the S&L, that 
“[judicial] resolution of even the facial merits of claims . . . would 
delay the receivership function of distribution of assets[,]” and that 
“such a delay is a ‘restraint’ within the scope of the statute.”181  
 The Fifth Circuit in Hudspeth therefore held that FSLIC as 
receiver “has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against the 
assets of an insolvent savings and loan association . . . subject first to 
review by the Bank Board and then to judicial review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act.”182  
 On Coit’s appeal from the district court’s application of 
Hudspeth, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Hudspeth conflicted 
with a Ninth Circuit decision in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG 
International, Inc.183 The Fifth Circuit, however, adhered to Hudspeth 
and affirmed the dismissal in Coit for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.184 When Coit reached the Supreme Court, the justices 
reversed the Fifth Circuit, rejected the reasoning of Hudspeth in favor 
of the Ninth Circuit’s view, and upheld the ability of courts to entertain 
                                               
178 Id. at 565-66. 
179 Id. (citing N. Miss. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th 
Cir. 1985)). 
180 Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1101. 
181 Id. at 1102. 
182 Coit, 489 U.S. at 565 (citing Hudspeth, 765 F.2d at 1003). 
183 Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. FirstSouth, F.A., 829 F.2d 563, 564 (5th Cir. 
1987); see also Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 
1212 (9th Cir. 1987) (“FSLIC has no power to adjudicate creditor claims . . . 
[and] exhaustion of administrative remedies may be a basis for dismissal or 
stay of proceedings, and remand for further consideration.”), cert. dismissed 
sub nom. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Stevenson Assocs., 488 U.S. 935 
(1988).  
184 Coit, 829 F.2d at 565. 
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de novo creditors’ claims against institutions that had been taken over 
by the FSLIC as receiver.185 
 
 The Fifth Circuit had held in Hudspeth that “[judicial] 
resolution of even the facial merits of claims . . . would delay . . . the 
distribution of assets” and that “such a delay is a ‘restraint’ within the 
scope of the statute.”186 (The court would have allowed judicial review 
under the APA.)187 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that Congress 
had not given the FSLIC authority to adjudicate creditors’ claims and 
therefore judicial consideration of those claims would not interfere 
with any authority granted by Congress to the FSLIC.188 The Ninth 
Circuit said: 
 
What has not been conferred cannot be derived by 
pointing to the time-consuming tasks that FSLIC as a 
receiver must undertake. At bottom FSLIC merely 
asserts that it could do its job faster and more 
efficiently if it had adjudicatory power. Perhaps true, 
but if Congress did not provide that adjudication 
would be among FSLIC’s receivership functions, the 
agency may not use section 1464(d)(6)(C) to achieve 
that result.189 
 
 It is noteworthy that in Morrison-Knudsen, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that FSLIC had adjudicatory authority in its role as 
supervisor of thrift institutions, as distinguished from its role as 
receiver. In that case, the court stated that “in the role of supervising 
ongoing thrift associations, FSLIC and the Board have been 
empowered by Congress to adjudicate violations of federal law, to 
issue cease-and-desist orders, to remove offending officers, and to 
impose civil penalties.”190 With respect to this adjudicatory authority, 
                                               
185 Coit, 489 U.S. at 568. 
186 Hudspeth, 756 F.2d at 1102. 
187 Id. at 1103. 
188 Morrison-Knudsen, 811 F.2d at 1217 (“[A] receiver’s ordinary functions 
do not include adjudication. Judicial adjudication, to repeat, does not restrain 
or affect a receivership; it simply determines the existence and amount of 
claims that a receiver is to honor in its eventual distribution of assets.”). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1219-20. 
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the statutory provisions gave “detailed, exact, and comprehensive 
measures, precisely delineating agency procedure, the remedies 
available, and judicial review. They make explicit reference to review 
under the APA.”191 
 The Ninth Circuit found the “inference . . . irresistible” that if 
Congress had intended to authorize FSLIC to adjudicate in its 
receivership role, it would have enacted similar provisions for that 
situation.192  
 The Supreme Court ruled in Coit that Congress had not 
conferred upon FSLIC as receiver “the power to adjudicate creditors’ 
claims.”193 The Court held that  
 
the directive that FSLIC as receiver “shall 
pay all valid credit obligations of the 
association” cannot be read to confer upon 
FSLIC the power to adjudicate claims . . . 
subject only to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. This 
provision . . . does not give FSLIC the power 
to adjudicate claims with the force of law; 
nor does it preclude claimants from resorting 
to the courts for a determination of the 
validity of their claims.194 
 
The Court said that when Congress “meant to confer 
adjudicatory authority on FSLIC it did so explicitly and set forth the 
relevant procedures in considerable detail[,]” specifying “the agency 
procedures to be followed and the remedies available, with explicit 
reference to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.”195 Congress had not done so with respect to creditors’ claims 
against the FSLIC as receiver.196 
                                               
191 Id. at 1220. 
192 Id.  
193 Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 
572 (1989) (“Congress granted FSLIC various powers in its capacity as 
receiver, but they do not include the power to adjudicate creditors’ claims.”). 
194 Id. at 573.  
195 Id. at 574. 
196 Id. 
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 The Solicitor General argued in the Supreme Court that, 
although Congress had not created a claims process, the Bank Board 
and FSLIC were authorized to use regulatory authority to establish a 
claims procedure for creditors and to require creditors to exhaust that 
procedure before seeking judicial review.197 The Supreme Court held 
that those regulations exceeded statutory authority (1) because they 
“purport to confer adjudicatory authority on FSLIC and on the Bank 
Board to make binding findings of fact and conclusions of law, subject 
only to ‘judicial review’ presumably under the Administrative 
Procedure Act as opposed to de novo judicial determination,” and (2) 
“the regulations do not place a clear and reasonable time limit on 
FSLIC’s consideration of whether to pay, settle, or disallow 
claims.”198 This administrative establishment of a claims procedure 
and requirement that it be exhausted before judicial review exceeded 
statutory authority, the Court held, noting that “[a]dministrative 
remedies that are inadequate need not be exhausted.”199 The Court 
supported its interpretation of the statute as not giving adjudicatory 
authority to FSLIC by noting that adjudication by FSLIC subject only 
to APA review would raise “serious constitutional difficulties” under 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., and 
related cases interpreting Congress’s authority under Article III of the 
Constitution to limit access to Article III courts.200 
 In Coit, the issue was whether creditors could secure de novo 
judicial review or only review under the APA. By holding “that FSLIC 
                                               
197 Id. at 579. 
198 Id. at 586. 
199 Id. at 587. 
200 Id. (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 
(1982)). In this discussion the Coit Court also cited Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) and Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22 (1932). Subsequent decisions have illuminated the limitations on 
Congress’s ability to limit the ability of Article III courts to review 
adjudication by administrative agencies. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 
492 U.S. 33, 54-55 (1989); see Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 
(2011); see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1942, 
1949 (2015). Without engaging the argument, it is pertinent to emphasize that 
even the cases that allow Congress to limit judicial review of agency 
adjudication do not authorize Congress to eliminate Article III court 
involvement altogether without the acquiescence of the parties. See, e.g., 
Schor, 478 U.S. at 848; Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 
2165, 2174 (2014); Crowell, 285 U.S. at 54. 
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has not been granted adjudicatory authority by Congress and that Coit 
is entitled to de novo” review, the Court did not need to “reach Coit’s 
claim that adjudication by FSLIC subject only to judicial review under 
the Administrative Procedure Act” would be unconstitutional.201 The 
Court said that the statute properly can and should be read to avoid 
“serious constitutional difficulties.”202 
 In Coit, the Supreme Court also rejected the Hudspeth ruling 
that allowing judicial review of creditors’ claims “‘would delay the 
receivership function of distribution of assets’ and that ‘such a delay 
is a “restraint” within the scope of the statute.’”203 Analyzing the anti-
injunction language in its statutory context, the Supreme Court noted 
that § 1464(d)(6)(A) “authorizes associations placed in receivership to 
bring suit . . . to challenge the receiver’s appointment.”204 “Following 
the provision for a court challenge to remove the receiver comes” the 
anti-injunction language.205 Thus, the Supreme Court said, “When 
read in its statutory context, this provision prohibits untimely 
challenges to the receiver’s appointment or collateral attacks 
attempting to restrain the receiver from carrying out its basic 
functions.”206 “In sum,” the Court wrote, allowing de novo judicial 
consideration of the claims “simply would not ‘restrain or affect’ 
FSLIC’s exercise of its receivership functions within the meaning of 
§ 1464(d)(6)(C).”207 
 In 1989, Congress enacted FIRREA to address “the massive 
losses occurring in the nation’s savings and loan institutions and the 
                                               
201 Coit, 489 U.S. at 578 (stating that Coit’s constitutional claims were (1) 
that denial of de novo review would violate Article III of the Constitution 
under Northern Pipeline, and (2) that FSLIC-only adjudication of state law 
claims would violate the Due Process Clause and the Seventh Amendment).  
202 Id. at 579. 
203 Id. at 566, 574.  
204 Id. at 575.  
205 Id. at 576. 
206 Id. at 575 (adding that the anti-injunction language “does not divest state 
and federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction to determine the validity of 
claims against institutions under a FSLIC receivership”). The Supreme Court 
explained that although FSLIC had made a jurisdictional argument (and may 
have continued to make it in other cases), the Solicitor General “concede[d] . 
. . that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Coit’s claim.” 
Id. at 572 & n.1 
207 Id. at 577. 
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deposit insurance fund protecting their depositors.”208 To fill the void 
that Coit had noted in FISA, FIRREA added § 1821(d)(3) creating an 
administrative procedure for bringing claims against the FDIC as 
receiver.209 Section 1821(d)(6)(A) provides for judicial review under 
the APA of the FDIC’s resolution of those claims.210 Section 
1821(d)(13)(D), titled “Limitation of judicial review,” provides that 
“except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have 
jurisdiction over” certain claims against the agency as receiver.211 
Although this expressly negates jurisdiction, “every court that has 
addressed the issue has interpreted § 1821(d)(13)(D) ‘as imposing a 
statutory exhaustion requirement rather than an absolute bar to 
jurisdiction.’”212 As the District of Columbia Circuit stated, “to 
                                               
208 Resolution Tr. Corp. v. W.W. Dev. & Mgmt., Inc., 73 F.3d 1298, 1303 (3d 
Cir. 1996); accord Rosa v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“Congress recently enacted FIRREA as a response to the crisis in the 
savings and loan industry that has commanded so much public attention in 
recent years.”); see O’Melveny & Myers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 512 U.S. 
79, 82 n.1 (1994). See generally United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 
839, 844-58 (1996) (discussing the background to the enactment of FIRREA, 
and earlier, unsuccessful attempts to bolster the savings and loan industry). 
209 W.W. Dev. & Mgmt., Inc., 73 F.3d at 1303 n.9 & 1306 n.15 (stating that 
Congress “designed FIRREA to be consistent with” the decision in Coit, 
providing what Coit had held was lacking for—FSLIC authority for the 
agency to adjudicate claims against failed institutions, “a reasonable time 
limit on the corporation’s ability to postpone judicial review,” and a 
requirement that the agency procedure be exhausted before judicial review); 
Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Tr. Corp., 17 F.3d 1269, 1274 n.5 (10th 
Cir. 1994) (“[S]etting up the FIRREA claims process, Congress intended to 
be responsive to the constitutional concerns raised by the Supreme Court in 
Coit.”). In his concurrence in Coit, Justice Scalia had cited the pending 
congressional consideration of FIRREA and said that “instead of the dicta in 
Part IV of the opinion, we should have remanded FSLIC to that legislative 
process.” Coit, 489 U.S. at 592 (Scalia, J., concurring). (A similar procedure 
is provided in HERA. See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(3) (2012)). 
210 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (2012). 
211 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D). 
212 Village of Oakwood v. State Bank & Tr. Co., 539 F.3d 373, 385-86 (6th 
Cir. 2008) (citing cases from the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and D.C. 
Circuits); see Sharpe v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 126 F.3d 1147, 1152 n.1 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (stating that “only” if a clamant did not request “administrative 
review of a claim determined by the FDIC” would the court review that claim 
de novo); Stamm v. Paul, 121 F.3d 635, 639-642 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
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foreclose judicial jurisdiction altogether [would be] . . . a result 
troubling from a constitutional perspective and certainly not the goal 
of FIRREA.”213  
The Tenth Circuit agreed, interpreting the preclusion of 
judicial review as an exhaustion requirement and holding that the 
district court did have jurisdiction to consider a claim against the 
receiver for matters not included in the claims process.214 The Tenth 
Circuit said: 
 
[W]ere we . . . to find these claims included in the 
jurisdictional bar of § 1821(d)(13)(D), Homeland 
would have neither an administrative nor a judicial 
forum for the claims. Such an outcome raises 
constitutional problems [citing Coit]. . . . . In this 
case the outcome would be that much more 
problematic [than in Coit] because Homeland would 
not only be denied timely judicial review, but all 
review.215 
 
D. HERA Does Not Preclude Judicial Review or the 
Provision of Injunctive or Other Equitable Relief 
Under the APA with Respect to Improper Denials 
of Mortgage Modifications 
 
 As we have seen above, there is no preclusion of judicial 
review of actions taken when FHFA is conservator of Fannie and 
                                               
extension of administrative claims procedure by RTC and FDIC to post-
receivership claims requires claimants to exhaust that procedure before 
seeking judicial review); Freeman v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 56 F.3d 1394, 
1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that the section bars courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over claims against the FDIC as receiver “unless the claimant first 
exhausts his administrative remedies by filing claims under the FDIC’s 
administrative claims process.”); Gallagher, supra note 147, at 43 (analyzing 
federal cases construing § 1821(j) and concluding that this section “limits the 
types of court actions that can be initiated against either [the FDIC or the 
RTC] [, but] [a]s indicated by Ward v. Resolution Trust Corp. . . . this 
protection from certain types of court action is not absolute”). 
213 Auction Co. of Am. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 141 F.3d 1198, 1200 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). 
214 Homeland Stores, Inc., 17 F.3d at 1276.  
215 Id. at 1274 n.5. 
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Freddie. There is an anti-injunction provision, § 4617(f), which says 
that “except as provided in this section or at the request of the Director, 
no court may take any action to restrain or affect the exercise of powers 
or functions of the Agency as a conservator or a receiver.”216 
 Section 4617(f) certainly does not immunize every action of 
FHFA from judicial review. It explicitly contemplates review 
“provided in this section or at the request of the Director.”217 
Moreover, it applies only when FHFA is acting “as a conservator or 
receiver.”218 In addition, it applies “only when the agency acts within 
the scope of its authorized powers.”219 Courts generally agree that “if 
the FHFA were to act beyond statutory or constitutional bounds in a 
manner that adversely impacted the rights of others, § 4617(f) would 
not bar judicial oversight or review of its actions.”220 The discussion 
below explores three reasons why § 4617(f) does not preclude review 
or equitable relief under the APA for denials of mortgage 
                                               
216 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012). Some courts discuss the section as if it were a 
jurisdictional bar. See Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 228 
n.22 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that the D.C. Circuit considers the provision “as 
a bar on relief,” but that the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits interpret it 
as a jurisdictional bar); In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. Derivative Litig., 
643 F. Supp. 2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va. 2009) (concluding that § 4617(f) is an 
anti-injunction provision), aff’d per curiam sub nom. La. Mun. Police Emps. 
Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 434 F. App’x 188 (4th Cir. 2011). There 
is disagreement about whether the anti-injunction language applies to 
rescission, declaratory judgments, and other non-injunctive forms of 
equitable relief. See, e.g., Heno v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 996 F.2d 429, 432 
n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting in dicta that the “express language does not appear 
to bar noninjunctive equitable relief against the FDIC”), withdrawn, 20 F.3d 
1204 (1st Cir. 1994); Rechler P’ship v. Resolution Tr. Corp., No. 90-3091, 
1990 WL 711357, at *7 (D. N.J. Sept. 7, 1990) (allowing declaratory 
judgment action). But see Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp., 21 F.3d 469, 471 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that distinguishing 
declaratory from injunctive relief for this purpose is foreclosed by California 
v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-09 (1982)).  
217 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012). 
218 Id. 
219 James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
220 Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 
2012) (quoting In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. Derivative Litig., 643 F. 
Supp. 2d at 799); accord County of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 
F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Sharpe v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 126 
F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
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modifications: first, FHFA’s actions in this regard are taken as 
regulator, not as conservator; second, adjudication of these requests is 
not within the authority Congress has given to FHFA as conservator; 
and, third, judicial oversight would not “restrain or affect” the powers 
of FHFA as conservator.221 
 
1. When FHFA Denies Mortgage Modifications 
for GSE Mortgages, It Is Acting as Regulator, 
not Conservator, of Fannie and Freddie 
 
 Courts agree that “FHFA cannot evade judicial scrutiny by 
merely labeling its actions with a conservator stamp.”222 As the 
Eleventh Circuit wrote in Leon County, “Congress did not intend that 
the nature of the FHFA’s actions would be determined based upon the 
FHFA’s self-declarations because the distinction between regulator 
and conservator would be one without a meaning or 
effect.”223        
  
“FHFA’s power has limits. . . . FHFA cannot evade judicial 
review and the APA’s requirements . . . simply by invoking its 
authority as conservator. Analysis of any challenged action is 
necessary to determine whether the action falls within the broad, but 
not infinite, conservator authority.”224  
 The PACE cases and Massachusetts v. Federal Housing 
Finance Agency analyzed whether a general directive issued by FHFA 
were a regulatory or conservatorship action.225 The Eleventh Circuit 
said that when FHFA issues a directive “that applies across the board 
to an entire category of cases, it contains an aspect of rulemaking and 
should therefore be carefully examined to assure that the FHFA is not 
simply attempting to avoid its responsibility to give notice and provide 
an opportunity for public comment.”226 As the Eleventh Circuit stated, 
courts “must consider all relevant factors pertaining to the directive . . 
                                               
221 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012). 
222 Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278; accord County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d at 994. 
223 Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278. 
224 County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d at 994. 
225 Town of Babylon v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 699 F.3d 221 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1273; Massachusetts v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 54 
F. Supp. 3d 94, 100 (D. Mass. 2014). 
226 Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278. 
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. includ[ing] . . . its subject matter, its purpose, its outcome, and 
whether it involves a matter in which public comment might be 
relevant, appropriate, useful, or intended by Congress.”227 A directive 
that “establish[es] a general set of criteria to be applied across the 
board by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to their mortgage transactions 
in general” would be a regulatory action.228 On the other hand, 
conservatorship actions are “discreet management decision[s];” 
actions that “evaluate[] the risks of certain business transactions and 
take[] prudential action to avoid those that it deems undesirable;” 
“directive[s] to an institution in conservatorship to mitigate or avoid a 
perceived financial risk;” “business judgment[s] intended to ‘preserve 
and conserve [the GSEs’] assets and property.’”229 
 In the PACE cases, the courts held that FHFA’s decision “not 
to purchase a class of mortgages that it believes pose excessive risk” 
is “‘within the responsibilities of a protective conservator, acting as a 
prudent business manager, to decline to purchase a mortgage when its 
lien will be relegated to an inferior position for payment.’”230 The 
Second Circuit described the PACE directive as “an FHFA directive 
to an institution in conservatorship to mitigate or avoid a perceived 
financial risk.”231  
 The issue here does not regard FHFA’s general directives 
(although Fannie’s Single-Family Servicing Guide and Freddie’s 
Single-Family Seller/Servicer Guide might well be required to be 
subject to the rulemaking requirements of the APA).232 The issue here 
is whether adjudication of homeowners’ claims for mortgage 
                                               
227 Id. 
228 Id. 
229 Massachusetts, 54 F.3d at 100-02; see also County of Sonoma v. Fed. 
Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 2013); Town of Babylon, 699 
F.3d 221, 227-28 (2d. Cir. 2012); Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278-79; Perry 
Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 222 (D.D.C. 2014). 
230 County of Sonoma, 710 F.3d at 993 (quoting Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1279). 
231 Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 228.  
232 See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012) (defining a “rule” as including “an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy”); Perez v. Mortg. Bankers 
Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (referencing “much scholarly and 
judicial debate” about when “rules” must be subject to notice-and-comment 
procedures); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 176-77 (5th Cir. 2015), as 
revised (Nov. 25, 2015), cert. granted, No. 15-674, 2016 WL 207257 (U.S. 
Jan. 19, 2016).  
 REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW VOL. 35 
 
 
214 
modifications is conservatorship action: that is, “discreet management 
decision[s]” that “evaluate[] the risks of certain business transactions 
and take[] prudential action to avoid those that it deems undesirable,” 
“business judgment[s] intended to ‘preserve and conserve [the GSEs’] 
assets and property.’”233 
 When homeowners challenge the failure of FHFA, Fannie, 
Freddie, and their servicers to adhere to HAMP standards, the 
homeowners are not asking the court to address “the exercise of 
powers or functions of the Agency as conservator.”234 The purpose of 
the anti-injunction language in HERA and FIRREA has been to avoid 
the courts’ interference with the conservator’s or receiver’s 
supervision of failed financial institutions.235 The anti-injunction 
language was not intended to immunize FHFA from judicial review of 
its disregard of the standards governing mortgage modifications under 
HAMP.236 
                                               
233 Massachusetts, 54 F.3d at 100-02; see Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 227-
28; see also Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (showing the unclear 
distinction between rulemaking and adjudication); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. 
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (holding that due process 
concerns attach only to adjudications, and not to rulemaking). 
234 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012) (emphasis added). 
235 See, e.g., Hindes v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 137 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 
1998) (“[A]nti-injunction provision intended to permit the FDIC to perform 
its duties as conservator or receiver promptly and effectively without judicial 
interference.”). Hindes gives a very expansive reading to the anti-injunction 
provision of § 1821(j) (FIRREA) holding that it “can preclude relief even 
against a third party . . . where the result is such that the relief ‘restrains or 
affects the exercise of powers . . . by an agency without being aimed directly 
at it.” Id. (emphasis in original). Nonetheless, Hindes notes that the anti-
injunction language would not apply where the effect of the court order 
“would be of little consequence to [the agency’s] overall functioning as a 
receiver.” Id. at 161. The court notes also that its holding “does not deny 
appellants a judicial remedy for an appropriate damages claim.” Id.  
236 See Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. CHG Int’l, Inc., 811 F.2d 1209, 1219 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (discussing the difference between the FSLIC’s “role as a receiver 
as compared to its role as a supervisor of thrift institutions”), cert. dism’d sub 
nom. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Stevenson Assocs., 488 U.S. 935 (1988); 
Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 734 
S.W.2d 374, 382 (Tex. App. 1986) (stating that this dispute “does not concern 
those processes that FSLIC was chiefly designed to promote” but rather 
“concerns . . . preventing FSLIC from exercising [a] . . . power of foreclosure, 
which constitute[s] matters outside those processes that are the chief function 
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 Adjudication of mortgage modification claims is not the 
action of a conservator. What makes absolutely clear that FHFA’s 
administration of GSE HAMP is an action of FHFA as regulator, and 
not as conservator, is the fact that FHFA also administers non-GSE 
HAMP, which governs all the mortgages that are not held, securitized, 
or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie. What FHFA does for non-GSE 
HAMP it does unquestionably in its capacity as regulator. The nature 
of FHFA’s administration of HAMP is not different for GSE HAMP. 
As FHFA’s administration of non-GSE HAMP is the action of FHFA 
as regulator, its administration of GSE HAMP is also the action of 
FHFA as regulator, not conservator.237 Those regulatory actions 
plainly are not within § 4617(f).238 
 
2. When FHFA Adjudicates Mortgage 
Modifications for GSE Mortgages, It is Acting 
Outside Its Statutory Authority as 
Conservator 
 
                                               
of FSLIC and situations arising after those processes have broken down”), 
writ of error denied, 750 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 
(1989).  
237 In the case that became County of Sonoma on appeal, the district court had 
held that FHFA’s PACE directives were actions of FHFA as regulator, not 
conservator, relying in part on the fact that FHFA’s PACE directives applied 
to the Federal Home Loan Banks (which were not in conservatorship) as well 
as to Fannie and Freddie. California ex rel. Harris v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 
894 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1218 (N.D. Cal. 2012), vacated sub nom. County of 
Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 710 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2013). The Ninth 
Circuit rejected this argument because FHFA had “directed the Enterprises 
and the Federal Home Loan Banks to do different things: . . . the . . . [b]anks 
were directed only to review their collateral policies.” County of Sonoma, 710 
F.3d at 994. The Ninth Circuit said “[t]hat FHFA treated different entities 
differently undermines . . . the conclusion that it was undertaking regulatory 
activity applicable to all the entities under its regulatory purview.” Id.; see 
also Town of Babylon, 699 F.3d at 228 n.5. With respect to HAMP, however, 
FHFA is treating all homeowners and servicers similarly—purporting to 
provide dispositive adjudication, with no judicial review, for all mortgage 
modification claims. 
238 See 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012) (“[N]o court may take any action to restrain 
or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the Agency as a conservator 
or a receiver”). 
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 The anti-injunction provision applies “only when the agency 
acts within the scope of its authorized powers.”239 “[I]f the FHFA were 
to act beyond statutory or constitutional bounds in a manner that 
adversely impacted the rights of others, § 4617(f) would not bar 
judicial oversight or review of its actions.”240 This principle was 
established under FIRREA and has been acknowledged as binding in 
the HERA cases as well.241 
 Comparing FHFA’s actions with respect to HAMP to the 
FSLIC actions at issue in Coit shows that in adjudicating homeowners’ 
claims for mortgage modifications, FHFA is acting outside the 
authority Congress has given to it. In Coit, the FSLIC claimed that, 
subject to judicial review under the APA, it had authority to adjudicate 
creditors’ claims against institutions the FSLIC had put into 
receivership. The Supreme Court held that Congress had not given that 
authority to the FSLIC, stating that  
 
the directive that FSLIC as receiver “shall 
pay all valid credit obligations of the 
                                               
239 James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
240 Leon Cnty. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 700 F.3d 1273, 1278 (11th Cir. 
2012) (quoting In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. Derivative Litig., 643 F. 
Supp. 2d 790, 799 (E.D. Va. 2009), aff’d per curiam sub nom. La. Mun. 
Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 434 Fed. App’x 188 (4th 
Cir. 2011)). 
241 See, e.g., Sharpe v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 126 F.3d 1147, 1155 (9th Cir. 
1997) (explaining that FIRREA anti-injunction provision “shields only the 
exercise of powers or functions Congress gave to the FDIC; the provision 
does not bar injunctive relief when the FDIC has acted beyond, or contrary 
to, its statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted, powers or functions’” 
(quoting Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 995 F.2d 238, 
240 (D.C. Cir. 1993)), judgment vacated, 5 F.3d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1993), 
reinstated in relevant part, 21 F.3d 469, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1065 (1994); James Madison Ltd., 82 F.3d at 1093-94 (“We thus 
read § 1821(j) to prevent courts from interfering with the FDIC on when the 
agency acts within the scope of its authorized powers.”); Freeman v. Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., 56 F.3d 1394, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Fischer v. 
Resolution Tr. Corp., 59 F.3d 1344, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Volges v. 
Resolution Tr. Corp., 32 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1994); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. 
v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 389-91 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994); Ward v. 
Resolution Tr. Corp., 996 F.2d 99, 103 (5th Cir. 1993). For a discussion of 
HERA, see Leon Cnty., 700 F.3d at 1278; Perry Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. 
Supp. 3d 208, 220 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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association” cannot be read to confer upon 
FSLIC the power to adjudicate claims . . . 
subject only to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. This 
provision . . . does not give FSLIC the 
power to adjudicate claims with the force of 
law; nor does it preclude claimants from 
resorting to the courts for a determination 
of the validity of their claims.242 
 
The Court said that when Congress “meant to confer 
adjudicatory authority, ‘it did so explicitly and set forth the relevant 
procedures in considerable detail, [specifying] . . . the agency 
procedures to be followed and the remedies available, with explicit 
reference to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure 
Act.’”243 Congress had not done so with respect to creditors’ claims 
against the receiver (involved in Coit) and Congress has not done so 
with respect to homeowners’ claims for modification of GSE 
mortgage loans. 
 In this situation, FHFA takes a position far more radical than 
that of the FSLIC in Coit. In Coit, FSLIC acknowledged that claimants 
could secure review under the APA of FSLIC’s decisions.244 Here, 
however, FHFA claims that homeowners are not entitled to any 
judicial supervision of FHFA’s decisions—neither APA review nor de 
novo review.245 Such an interpretation of HERA raises obvious and 
grave constitutional problems. 
 Coit claimed that adjudication by the FSLIC subject only to 
judicial review under the APA, denying de novo review, would violate 
Article III of the Constitution under Northern Pipeline Construction 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,246 the Due Process Clause, and the 
Seventh Amendment.247 By holding “that FSLIC has not been granted 
adjudicatory authority by Congress and that Coit is entitled to de novo” 
                                               
242 Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 
573 (1989). 
243 Id. at 574. 
244 Id. 
245 See supra notes 142-71 and the accompanying text. 
246 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
247 Coit 489 U.S. at 578; see N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 117 (1982). 
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review, the Court was able to avoid these “serious constitutional 
difficulties.”248 
 These “serious constitutional difficulties” appear with even 
more force here, where FHFA claims the power to make dispositive 
decisions without any judicial involvement whatsoever, and Northern 
Pipeline’s powerful protections of the judicial power vested in Article 
III courts have been reinforced by Granfinanciera v. Nordberg and 
Stern v. Marshall,249 and other decisions of the Supreme Court.250 The 
Supreme Court has been steadfast in its determination to prohibit 
Congress from “impermissibly threaten[ing] the institutional integrity 
of the Judicial Branch” or “emasculat[ing] constitutional courts and 
thereby prevent ‘the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch 
at the expense of the other.’”251 Even in the decisions that allowed 
some exercise of adjudicatory power by agencies, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that some action by Article III courts continued to be 
required.252   
 The language of the financial regulation statutes does not give 
to FHFA, Treasury, Fannie, or Freddie authority to adjudicate these 
claims by homeowners. Section 4617(b)(5), added by HERA, deals 
with the authority of the receiver to determine claims, § 4617(b)(5)(D) 
gives the receiver authority to disallow claims, and § 4617(b)(5)(E) 
                                               
248 Coit, 489 U.S. at 578-79. 
249 492 U.S. 33 (1989); 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
250 Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1951 (2015) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Although Congress may assign some bankruptcy 
proceedings to non-Article III courts, there are limits on that power.”). 
251 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 
(1986); see Wellness Int’l, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 (quoting Schor). 
252 See, e.g., Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 
(2014) (“[E]ven though bankruptcy courts are statutorily authorized to enter 
final judgment on a class of bankruptcy-related claims, namely, those labeled 
by Congress as ‘core,’ Article III of the Constitution prohibits bankruptcy 
courts from finally adjudicating certain of those claims, including a common-
law counterclaim for tortious interference against a creditor to the estate.”); 
Schor, 478 U.S. at 853 (“CFTC orders . . . are enforceable only by order of 
the district court.”); Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health 
Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 450 n.7 (1977) (referencing agency 
adjudication “as an adjunct to an Art. III court”); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 
22, 54 (1932) (holding it is essential to “preserv[e] [the] complete authority 
[of courts] to insure the proper application of the law”). 
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precludes judicial review of agency determinations under (5)(D).253 
Section 4617(b)(6) provides for judicial determination of claims.254 
But all of § 4617(b)(5) and (6) deal with receivership only, not 
conservatorship, and receivership only is addressed by § 
4617(b)(11)(D), which provides that  
     
 Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction 
over – 
 
  (i) any claim or action for payment 
from or any action seeking a determination 
of rights with respect to, the assets or charter 
of any regulated entity for which the Agency 
has been appointed receiver; or 
 
  (ii) any claim relating to any act or 
omission of such regulated entity or the 
Agency as receiver.255 
 
When FHFA acts as conservator, the statute does not provide 
an elaborate procedure for resolving claims, as it does with respect to 
receivership. Section 4617(b)(2)(H), regarding “[p]ayment of valid 
obligations,” gives the agency authority to “determin[e] any claim 
against the regulated entity,”256 but this is similar to the provision 
found inadequate in Coit, where the Supreme Court held that  
 
the directive that FSLIC as receiver “shall 
pay all valid credit obligations of the 
association” cannot be read to confer upon 
FSLIC the power to adjudicate claims . . . 
subject only to review under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. This 
provision . . . does not give FSLIC the power 
                                               
253 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(5) (2012) 
254 § 4617(b)(6). 
255 § 4617(b)(11)(D). Section 4617(d)(8)(B), regarding “Certain qualified 
financial contracts,” also refers to “any judicial action or proceeding brought 
against any receiver.” 
256 § 4617(b)(2)(I)(i)(I). 
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to adjudicate claims with the force of law; 
nor does it preclude claimants from resorting 
to the courts for a determination of the 
validity of their claims.257 
 
There is no reason to believe that Congress had any intention 
to confer on FHFA dispositive adjudicatory authority over mortgage 
modification claims. To avoid such “serious constitutional 
difficulties” as the Supreme Court identified in Coit, the statutes 
should be interpreted in accordance with their language, which makes 
no provision for agency adjudication of these claims. There is, 
therefore, no basis for concluding that judicial consideration of such 
claims would interfere with or restrain any actions within the authority 
Congress has given to FHFA.258  
 FHFA’s position with respect to this issue is startling: that it 
can create a program that allows mortgage foreclosure relief to some 
homeowners but denies it to many others and that a homeowner 
dissatisfied with FHFA’s administration of this program cannot secure 
                                               
257 Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 
573 (1989).  
258 See Glen Ridge I Condominiums, Ltd. v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp, 734 
S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App. 1986) (holding that 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d)(6)(C), 
barring a court from “restrain[ing] or affect[ing] the exercise of powers or 
functions of a receiver,” unconstitutionally vests in the FSLIC power to 
adjudicate a request to enjoin foreclosure), writ of error denied, 750 S.W.2d 
757 (Tex. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); see also Nat’l Tr. for 
Historic Pres. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 995 F.2d 238, 239 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 
1993). The National Trust panel, per curiam, emphasized that the case 
involved the FDIC’s “performing a routine ‘receivership’ function”; the panel 
majority said: “Deciding only the clear case before us, we do not reach further 
to consider whether § 1821(j) covers every other case a legal mind could 
conjure.” Id. at 240. Judge Wald dissented from the panel’s deciding the issue 
on a motion for a stay, eschewing full briefing and argument. She noted that 
considerations of congressional intent, and in particular indications of 
“congressional concern for the availability of alternative remedies,” should 
be taken into account. Id. at 242 n.2. She wrote that the record before the court 
“shows no congressional intent, reflected in the legislative history, to grant 
the FDIC virtually unprecedented authority to carry out its statutory 
responsibilities . . . unfettered by any judicial intervention.” Id. at 243. When 
the Court of Appeals subsequently reheard the case, it accepted this analysis 
by Judge Wald. Nat’l Tr. for Historic Pres. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 21 F.3d 
469, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1065 (1994). 
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judicial review of the actions (or inactions) by or on behalf of the 
agency.259 Congress did provide in § 4617(b) (HERA) a “sweeping 
ouster of courts’ power to grant equitable remedies”; this “may appear 
drastic.”260 This apparent grant of “immense discretion” to the agency 
has been justified as in service to Congress’s determination to allow a 
crisis to be resolved expeditiously by a conservator or receiver.261 It 
does not and cannot justify a grant of vast, unreviewable discretion to 
an agency that is setting standards and applying them to mortgages 
held not only by the institutions that are in conservatorship but to all 
institutions that hold or guarantee mortgages. 
 
3. Allowing Injunctive Relief for 
Mortgage Modification Denials that 
Violate Program Standards Would 
Not “Restrain or Affect” the Power of 
FHFA as Conservator 
 
 Finally, even if the anti-injunction language were thought to 
apply to the actions of Fannie and Freddie in the administration of 
HAMP, the language bars only claims that “restrain or affect” the 
operations of the conservator.262 Requiring adherence to HAMP’s 
standards would not “restrain or affect” the conservatorship. Coit is 
very much on point here. In Coit, Congress had not given the agency 
authority to adjudicate creditors’ claims against the institution in 
receivership; here, Congress has not given the agency authority to 
adjudicate homeowners’ modification claims against the institution in 
conservatorship.263 In Coit, the Supreme Court held that Congress’s 
failure to provide for agency consideration of those claims meant that 
de novo judicial review of those claims was appropriate.264 And in Coit 
                                               
259 See supra notes 15-17, 71-78, 142-71 and the accompanying text. 
260 Freeman v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 56 F.3d 1394, 1398-99 (D.C. Cir. 
1995) (addressing an equivalent provision of FIRREA); see also Perry 
Capital LLC v. Lew, 70 F. Supp. 3d 208, 220 n.12 (D.D.C. 2014). 
261 Perry Capital LLC, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 225; see Freeman, 56 F.3d at 1399. 
262 12 U.S.C. § 4617(f) (2012). 
263 Coit Indep. Joint Venture v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 
575 (1989) (“[N]one of the statutes governing FSLIC and the Bank Board 
confer upon FSLIC the power to adjudicate claims against an insolvent 
savings and loan over which FSLIC has been appointed receiver.”). 
264 Id.  
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the Court said that judicial resolution of such claims would not restrain 
or interfere with the powers and functions of the receiver.265 
 Moreover, that judicial review might cause some delay in final 
determination of modification requests does not ipso facto mean that 
judicial review will “restrain or affect” the powers of FHFA as 
conservator. In James Madison Ltd., for example, the D.C. Circuit said 
that causing some delay in the agency’s actions “would not necessarily 
frustrate Congress’s goal of winding up the affairs of troubled 
institutions expeditiously,” and emphasized that the statute has other 
purposes as well, including an intention “to protect the rights of 
financial institutions by allowing them to appeal their seizures.”266 
Similarly, HERA evidences strong congressional concern to protect 
the interests of homeowners and to prevent unnecessary foreclosures. 
 For all these reasons, the anti-injunction language of HERA 
does not bar federal courts from reviewing claims that the servicers 
handling loans owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have violated 
the standards governing HAMP. Homeowners making those claims 
are entitled to judicial review under the APA. 
                                               
265 Id. (“[A]t the time of the statute’s enactment it was well established at 
common law that suits establishing the existence or amount of a claim against 
an insolvent debtor did not interfere with or restrain the receiver’s possession 
of the insolvent’s assets or its exclusive control over the distribution of assets 
to satisfy claims.”).  
266 James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
